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In order to hold the global warming below 2 degrees Celsius, also developing
countries are required to urgently limit their greenhouse gas emissions. However,
developing countries tend to fear that climate policy measures could harm their
development.
Assessing whether or not such worries are justified requires deep understanding
of the drivers of economic development. On the one hand, it is currently widely
accepted that societal capabilities, including aspects like institutions, various in-
frastructure, human capital and social capital, are the determinants of long-term
economic performance. On the other hand, development is known to be accom-
panied by structural change. Recent empirical evidence provides support to the
hypothesis that capabilities and structural change are fundamentally linked. It
seems that the expansion and the diversification of production contribute to ca-
pabilities which then enable further diversification into productive activities that
require these capabilities.
This thesis seeks to explain how societal capabilities, structural change and de-
velopment interact, and what this interaction implies for climate policy. A multi-
sector endogenous growth model driven by the interplay of capabilities and struc-
tural change is proposed. The model implies that if climate policy interferes with
structural change by harming the operation of some sectors, economic growth
may temporarily slow down or even permanently stagnate. Hence, climate policy
can threat development, whereby poorer countries are more severely affected. To
avoid adverse effects, this theory suggests a focus on capabilities in policy design.
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Jotta ilmaston la¨mpeneminen voitaisiin rajoittaa kahteen asteeseen, myo¨s kehit-
tyvien maiden on pikaisesti rajoitettava kasvihuonekaasupa¨a¨sto¨ja¨a¨n. Useat kehit-
tyva¨t maat kuitenkin pelka¨a¨va¨t, etta¨ ilmastopolitiikka voi vahingoittaa niiden
taloudellista kehitysta¨.
Jotta voitaisiin arvioida, onko huoli perusteltu, on ymma¨rretta¨va¨ taloudellisen
kehityksen ajureita. On yleisesti tunnustettua, etta¨ yhteiskunnalliset kyvykkyy-
det, sisa¨lta¨en muun muassa instituutiot, erilaisen infrastruktuurin seka¨ inhimilli-
sen ja sosiaalisen pa¨a¨oman, ma¨a¨ritta¨va¨t talouden kehityksen pitka¨lla¨ aikava¨lilla¨.
Toisaalta talouden rakennemuutoksen tiedeta¨a¨n la¨hes poikkeuksetta esiintyva¨n
talouden kehityksen yhteydessa¨. Viimeisimma¨t empiiriset tutkimustulokset tuke-
vat hypoteesia, jonka mukaan kyvykkyydet ja rakennemuutos liittyva¨t perusta-
vanlaatuisesti toisiinsa. Vaikuttaa silta¨, etta¨ tuotannon laajentaminen ja moni-
puolistaminen kehitta¨va¨t kyvykkyyksia¨. Uudet kyvykkyydet taas mahdollistavat
uudenlaiset tuotantoaktiviteetit, joille juuri na¨ma¨ kyvykkyydet ovat toimintae-
dellytys.
Ta¨ma¨ diplomityo¨ pyrkii selitta¨ma¨a¨n yhteiskunnallisten kyvykkyyksien, rakenne-
muutoksen ja taloudellisen kehityksen vuorovaikutusta ja sen seurauksia ilmasto-
politiikan kannalta. Tyo¨ssa¨ esiteta¨a¨n monisektorinen endogeeninen talouskasvu-
malli, jossa kyvykkyyksien ja rakennemuutoksen vuorovaikutus on kasvun ajuri.
Mallin valossa talouskasvu saattaa va¨liaikaisesti hidastua tai jopa pysyva¨sti la-
maantua, jos ilmastopolitiikka puuttuu rakennemuutokseen ha¨iritsema¨lla¨ joiden-
kin sektorien toimintaa. Ta¨ten ilmastopolitiikka voi uhata kehitysta¨. Vaikutukset
va¨hemma¨n kehittyneisiin maihin ovat suurempia. Jotta vahingolliset seuraukset
voidaan va¨ltta¨a¨, ta¨ma¨ teoria kehottaa huomioimaan kyvykkyydet politiikan suun-
nittelussa.
Asiasanat: Kyvykkyydet, rakennemuutos, ilmastopolitiikka, kehitys-
maat, monisektorinen endogeeninen talouskasvumalli
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Climate change is undoubtedly the greatest threat mankind currently faces
(World Economic Forum, 2016). In December 2015 195 countries negotiated
in Paris in the 21st Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC (COP21),
where they agreed to hold the average temperature increase “well below”
two degrees Celsius in comparison to the pre-industrial levels. To achieve
this, ambitious policy measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will be
necessary. Many, first and foremost the developing countries, have concerns
about the economic effects of climate policy measures. Indian Prime minister
Narendra Modi said famously at the opening of the COP21 that “climate
justice demands that with the little carbon space we still have, developing
countries should have enough room to grow”. But exactly how would climate
policy hamper economic development?
To answer, we must first understand development. It is currently a widely
accepted hypothesis that fundamental capabilities, including aspects like in-
stitutions, various infrastructure, human capital and social capital, set the
framework for growth and determine the long-run performance of economies.
These capabilities go under different names in the literature, such as “so-
cial overhead capital” (Hirschman, 1958), “social capabilities” (Abramovitz,
1986), “technological capabilities” (Lall, 1992) and “social infrastructure”
(Hall and Jones, 1999). Many studies have found that capabilities limit the
possibilities of developing countries to adapt advanced technology developed
elsewhere (Borensztein et al., 1998; Murphy, 2001; Gallagher, 2006).
1
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Another central insight in development economics is that development entails
structural change, i.e. the reallocation of economic activity from agriculture
to manufacturing and later services. Historically, industrialization has been
the key enabler of rapid and sustained economic growth rates and has per-
mitted a number of countries, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, to
catch up with the Western nations. Rodrik (2016) describes three features
that make manufacturing activities instrumental in the growth process: the
unconditional labor productivity convergence that manufacturing sectors ex-
hibit, the capability to absorb significant quantities of relatively unskilled
labor, and the tradable nature which sets manufacturing free of the demand
constraints of the domestic market.
However, not all countries manage to move significant fractions of labor to
manufacturing and industrialize their economies. Structural change seems to
be vulnerable to outside influences: McMillan et al. (2014) documented that
since 1990 labor has moved to lower-productivity activities in Latin America
and Africa (although things seem to have turned around for Africa after
2000). Rodrik (2016) found a significant premature deindustrialization trend
also outside the developed economies. They suspect that this is a result of
globalization and exposure to foreign competition.
The understanding of structural change has greatly improved as a result of
recent empirical findings. Hausmann and Klinger (2006) studied the network
relatedness of exported products using international trade data to build a net-
work they named the “product space”, where nodes are different products
and links are pairwise probabilities that a country that effectively exports
one also effectively exports the other. This probability is also taken to be a
measure of “proximity”, which is assumed to signal how similar the capabil-
ities needed to produce these products are. Hausmann and Klinger (2006)
showed that the product space is not smooth but heterogeneous, some ar-
eas being dense and others sparse. They found that the speed of structural
transformation depends on the density of the product space near the prod-
ucts which the country currently exports. Hidalgo et al. (2007) found that
the product space has a core-periphery structure, with most upscale products
located to the densely connected core while lower income products occupy
a less connected periphery. They also concluded that economies grow by
upgrading the products they export, and that countries tend to move to
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products close to what they are currently producing. This suggests that the
capabilities needed to make upgraded products are more easily adapted from
some products than others.
Radebach et al. (2016) studied structural change on a disaggregated sectoral
level with production data from 57 sectors. Their results replicate the broad
pattern of aggregate structural change, but in addition they identified robust
patterns on a disaggregated level. They found what they call “bridging
sectors”, classified as light manufacturing, which seem to act as bottlenecks
in the transition from agriculture to an industrialized economy. A possible
explanation is, as Radebach et al. (2016) hypothesize, that while building the
production in these sectors, the economy develops also various capabilities,
which are necessary to upgrade production.
It seems probable that capabilities and structural change are fundamentally
connected: production in certain sectors contributes to capabilities, which
then enable the production in some other sectors. This raises a question:
what if climate policy interferes with structural change? If it hinders pro-
duction in the vital bridging sectors, the affected economy may not be able
to build the capabilities it needs to industrialize. It is not difficult to think of
ways how climate policy could impede certain sectors; emission taxes could
harm the competitiveness of a sector against similar goods produced some-
where else with cleaner technology, or performance standards could raise
the minimum level of capabilities that are required to operate the bridging
sectors themselves.
The economic literature provides little help in studying this issue. Analyses
of structural change tend to be based on the aggregated sectors of agricul-
ture, manufacturing and services. The shifts of activity are explained either
through differing rates of total factor productivity growth between these sec-
tors, i.e. faster advancements of technology in manufacturing and services
compared to agriculture, or through non-homothetic preferences of the con-
sumers, i.e. the desire to consume relatively more manufactured goods and
later services as income grows (Herrendorf et al., 2014). Generally the tech-
nology advancements are taken as given and not modeled endogenously. To
consider the effect of climate policy on this process, a different kind of a
theory is needed.
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This leads us to the research questions of this thesis: How can the interaction
between societal capabilities, structural change and economic development
be explained? What does it imply for climate policy?
The objectives of this thesis are to to construct a theory of economic growth
that is consistent with the literature on capabilities and the main observed
features of economic development as well as the newest empirical findings
regarding structural change, and to use the attained framework to provide
insights on the possible implications of the introduction of climate policy to
developing economies.
This thesis presents a multi-sector endogenous growth model that enables the
analysis of economic growth and structural change on a more granular level
than the traditional three aggregated sectors, on which the literature mostly
focuses. The model incorporates capabilities as a key driver of structural
change and therefore economic development. The central hypothesis is that
capabilities can be acquired by building up production in a string of sectors in
a given order. The acquisition of additional capabilities enables production
in more complex sectors and productivity growth in sectors that already
operate.
The main result of this thesis is that given our assumptions, climate policy
can pose a threat to development by temporarily slowing down growth or even
by driving economies to stagnation, and that poorer countries are especially
in danger. To our knowledge, this is the first effort to theoretically show
that climate policy can have an effect on long term development. To avoid
adverse effects, this theory suggests a focus on capabilities in policy design.
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the relevant liter-
ature on developing countries and climate policy as well as capabilities and
structural change. Chapter 3 presents the growth model and its implica-
tions to climate policy. Chapter 4 discusses the model and its insights, and
Chapter 5 concludes.
Chapter 2
Literature review
This chapter introduces the relevant past research and serves as a basis for
the model developed in the following chapter. The first section establishes the
relevance of climate policy to developing countries and introduces the risks
associated with it in the past literature. The second section overviews the
different suggested concepts of capabilities, their empirically found relevance
to growth and how capabilities are thought to accumulate. The third section
elaborates on the role of structural change in development and on the interac-
tion between structural change and capabilities. The fourth section presents
how capabilities and structural change have been modeled previously.
2.1 Developing countries and climate policy
The anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), such as carbon
dioxide (CO2), increase the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere and
therefore raise surface temperatures and acidify oceans. According to the
fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), rising surface temperatures are expected to cause increasing extreme
weather phenomena, such as more intense and more frequent heat waves and
extreme precipitation events, as well as warming oceans, rising sea levels
and changes in the precipitation patterns. In many mid-latitude dry regions
precipitation will likely decrease and in many mid-latitude wet regions pre-
5
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cipitation will likely increase. Climate change is expected to undermine food
security, decrease the amount of renewable surface water and groundwater
in most subtropical dry regions and lead to increases in ill-health in many
regions, mostly in developing countries. Developing countries are generally
recognized to be especially vulnerable, both because of their location in the
most impacted areas near the equator and their lower ability to adapt to the
changes (IPCC, 2014).
IPCC (2014) estimates that to limit the global warming likely under 2 degrees
Celsius, the GHG emissions reductions need to reach 40 to 70% by 2050
compared to 2010 and by 2100 the emissions need to be near zero or even
negative, depending on the scenario. There are little signs of movements in
this direction. On the global scale, GHG emissions in CO2 equivalents have
been accelerating: between 1970 and 2000 their growth averaged 1.3% per
year, whereas between 2000 and 2010 the growth was already 2.2% per year
(IPCC, 2014).
To better understand the rise of CO2 emissions, we can look at the Kaya iden-
tity that decomposes four drivers of emissions: population growth, economic
growth, the energy intensity of the economy and the carbon intensity of en-
ergy: CO2 = P x
GDP
P
x E
GDP
x CO2
E
, where P stands for population, GDP for
gross domestic product and E for energy (Kaya et al., 1990). Raupach et al.
(2007) found that currently the economic growth in developing countries is
the main driver for increasing the global CO2 emissions. In 2004, developing
and the least developed countries accounted for 73% of the global emissions
growth. (However, they also accounted for 80% of the population and only
41% of the global emissions and 23% of the cumulative emissions). Some
of the emissions growth is driven by the rising carbon intensity of energy
in poor, fast-growing countries that use coal to satisfy their energy demand
(Steckel et al., 2015). Jakob et al. (2012) found that developing countries
that economically converge to the world average are also converging to the
energy use patterns of developed countries, whereas the economic growth in
high income countries is partially decoupling from energy use, but clearly at
an unsustainable level.
Considering the growing role of developing countries in the production of
emissions, it is obvious that they also are required to reduce their emissions.
The possibilities for emissions control policies are broad, including both in-
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centive based policies and direct regulatory instruments. Goulder and Parry
(2008) listed incentive based policies to include emissions taxes, subsidies
to emissions abatement, taxes on goods associated with emissions and auc-
tioned or freely allocated tradable emissions allowances, or a hybrid of these.
Direct regulatory instruments include mandated abatement technologies and
performance standards. In an ideal world where the policy makers would
know everything and there would be no uncertainties, all of the instruments
would yield the same emission reductions with the same costs, which are in
the end borne by the consumers that purchase emissions-intensive goods or
services. However, in reality the best policy choice depends on various things.
Goulder and Parry (2008) named economic efficiency, cost-effectiveness, the
distribution of benefits and costs, the ability to address uncertainties and
political feasibility as evaluation criteria.
Even though studies have identified significant synergies with climate policy
measures, such as improved energy security and decreased air pollution and
related illnesses (McCollum et al., 2013), it is clear that in developing coun-
tries climate policy will incur costs relative to the business-as-usual. This
could tie funds that could otherwise be used for poverty eradication. As
it also recognized that developing countries have contributed little to the
historical emissions that have caused climate change, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change has agreed that developed coun-
tries will cover “the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties
in complying with their obligations” (United Nations, 1992).
However, despite their greater vulnerability to climate damages and the
promised compensations, in climate negotiations developing countries of-
ten oppose binding emission reduction targets and strongly advocate for
their rights to continue the use of fossil fuels. Illustratively the then In-
dian environmental minister Jairam Ramesh declared in an interview that
India, China, South Africa and Brazil had “protected their right to continued
economic growth” by torpedoing the attempts to impose binding targets of
global emissions reductions in COP15 (ABC News, 2009).
It is undisputed that economic growth needs to continue for developing coun-
tries to reach higher development levels (Rodrik, 2014) and to be able to
absorb the climate stress that also a 2 degree warming brings (Bowen et al.,
2012).
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Goldemberg et al. (1998) argue that continued economic growth in devel-
oping countries is possible in compliance with the emission targets if the
developing economies “leapfrog” the emission-intensive development steps
that the current industrialized countries have taken and instead incorporate
modern efficient technologies early in the development process. They provide
examples, such as the use of solar panels and efficient light bulbs to provide
lighting in rural areas instead of kerosene lanterns, thus leapfrogging over the
phase of building an electrical grid.
In fact, leapfrogging is exactly what the developing countries are expected to
do. Steckel et al. (2013) assessed the data from different integrated assess-
ment models used by the IPCC to produce mitigation scenarios for its assess-
ment reports and found that developing countries are projected to undertake
substantial energy efficiency and carbon intensity improvements compared
to the business-as-usual scenario, while continuing to grow. Particularly in
ambitious mitigation scenarios, developing countries are projected to not
significantly increase their energy use from current levels, implying radical
decoupling of energy use and economic growth already at low levels of devel-
opment.
However, several scholars have found that the lack of various capabilities
limits the possibilities for leapfrogging. Steckel et al. (2013) argue for the
existence of minimum energy thresholds that need to be fulfilled in order to
enable the economy to develop past a certain level. Murphy (2001) exam-
ined three technologies targeted at rural households in East Africa (conven-
tional grid expansion, renewable energy technologies supplying electricity,
and improved cookstoves) and concluded that “technological capabilities”
with technical, institutional and organizational components limit the ability
of the people to switch into using or supplying these technologies. Gallagher
(2006) found that the introduction of US automotive technology through
Sino-US joint ventures in passenger cars failed to induce leapfrogging in the
Chinese automobile industry. He emphasizes that often developing countries
do not have the technological capabilities to produce or integrate advanced
energy technologies themselves. On a more general level, Borensztein et al.
(1998) discovered that foreign direct investment only contributes to economic
growth when a sufficient “absorptive capability of advanced technologies”,
which they associate with human capital, is available in the host economy.
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Marcotullio and Schulz (2007) in fact found evidence of some leapfrogging:
the developing world experiences energy-related transitions faster and at
lower levels of income and therefore has a lower systematic environmental
impact per capita than the United States. However, they also found that
these transitions are limited by inadequate financial revenues to provide for
the simultaneous changes in infrastructure, social and environmental needs,
i.e. the necessary capabilities.
Moreover, climate policy has also been associated with possible adverse ef-
fects on capability building. Jakob et al. (2015) claim that the possibly
sizeable inflows of climate finance could create a “climate finance curse” (as
oppose to a resource curse, see e.g. Van der Ploeg (2011)). If the climate
finance scheme would take the form of international emissions trading where
the developing countries would be allocated more emission permits than they
need themselves, the fluctuation of the emission permit price could cause in-
creasing volatility in the economy. Moreover, the inflow of finance could
result in a “Dutch disease”, where the currency of the recipient country ap-
preciates and causes the export sectors to contract. On the domestic level
climate finance transfers through the government’s budget could promote
“rent-seeking”, i.e. private agents seeking to get disproportionate amounts
of funding in relation to their mitigation efforts. If government officials are
entrusted with selecting the funded projects, this could lead to increasing
corruption. However, Jakob et al. (2015) argue that most serious problems
could be prevented by appropriately designed policies.
Also domestic climate policy poses risks to capabilities. Climate policy is
likely to result in rising energy prices, as the lifetime cost of energy for many
renewable energy technologies is still higher than current energy prices, and
for instance a carbon tax would raise the prices of fossil fuels (Edenhofer
et al., 2011). Jakob and Steckel (2014) argue that this could undermine the
energy access of the poor and discourage investments in energy intensive
capital goods, such as infrastructure. This change in investment patterns
could delay structural change, particularly industrialization. Historically, in-
dustrialization has enabled countries to reach high living standards (Rodrik,
2014).
The next two sections will dig deeper into the concepts, roles and drivers of
capabilities and structural change, and the interaction between them.
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2.2 Capabilities
2.2.1 Concept
The concept of capabilities is best known as an approach to welfare and social
justice, developed by Amartya Sen. He first published his theory in 1979 (Sen,
1979) and has since elaborated it in many publications. Sen (1989) explains
that individuals’ capabilities to function, i.e. capabilities to convert the same
resources into valuable “functionings” can differ greatly, and therefore an
evaluation of well-being focusing only on means without considering what
particular people can do with them is insufficient. Sen defined functionings
as states of “being and doing”, such as being well-nourished, having shelter.
They should be distinguished from the commodities employed to achieve
them - as bicycling is distinguishable from possessing a bike. Sen understood
poverty as a deprivation of the capability to live a good life and development
as capability expansion. He refused to provide a list of necessary capabilities
and emphasized freedom.
Sen’s capability approach has a counterpart in development economics to
explain the shortcomings of the neo-classical growth theory, which identi-
fied technological development as the source of sustained economic growth
(Solow, 1956). The neo-classical theory considered technology to be a kind of
a public good: non-rival and non-excludable, something that everyone could
utilize with no incurred costs. Hence, the theory implied a convergence hy-
pothesis: at some stage, all countries should converge to the same income
level, known also as unconditional convergence. However, empirical research
could not find evidence of it. Instead, so-called conditional convergence is
well supported in the data. Regions within countries and similar developed
countries do seem to converge (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Analogously
to Sen’s approach for individuals, it seems that countries greatly differ in their
abilities to utilize technology. Currently a widely recognized hypothesis is
that fundamental capabilities, such as institutional quality, macroeconomic
stability and human capital set the framework for growth, and ultimately
long-term growth depends on the accumulation of these capabilities (Rodrik,
2014).
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But as Abramowitz (1994) points out, capabilities are a poorly defined and
a vague subject of matters, few of which can be clearly defined or measured.
Numerous scholars have suggested similar and variably overlapping concepts
under the same of different names. The following provides a brief overview
of some of them.
Hirschman (1958) introduced the concept of “social overhead capital”, which
he defined to comprise of basic services without which primary, secondary and
tertiary productive activities cannot function. These include, for instance,
law and order, education, public health, transportation, communications,
power and water supply as well as agricultural overhead capital, such as
irrigation and drainage systems. He named three conditions for inclusion:
first, the service needs to facilitate or be basic to carrying on of a great
variety of economic activities. Second, the services should be provided by
public agencies or by private agencies subject to some public control. Third,
these services cannot be imported. Hirschman theorizes that investment in
social overhead capital both permits and invites directly productive activities
to come in.
Rosovsky et al. (1973) first introduced the term “social capability” to describe
factors contributing to country’s ability to import or engage in technological
and organizational progress. They argue that a low level of social capabilities
could limit the possibilities to introduce advanced foreign technology. Later
Abramovitz (1986) adopted the term and defined it as technical competence,
along with political, commercial, financial and industrial institutions. By
these he explained to mean the stability and the effectiveness of the govern-
ment, as well as the experience with the organization and management of a
large scale enterprise, and with financial institutions and markets capable of
mobilizing capital for individual firms. In a later work he expanded the defi-
nition to include social attitudes and issues with incentives and opportunities
(Abramovitz, 1989).
A Korean development scholar Kim (1980) used the term “technological ca-
pabilities” to describe features that firms needed in order to be competitive.
He later defined technological capabilities to include production capabilities,
investment capabilities and innovation capabilities, and also used the term on
an aggregate economy-wide level in addition to the original firm-level (Kim,
1997).
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Lall (1992) defined technological capabilities a little differently. He sees that
firm-level technological capabilities, including production capabilities, invest-
ment capabilities and linkage capabilities (with other local actors), form the
base for national technological capabilities, which can be characterized as the
common element of response of firms to the policy, market and institutional
framework. Lall groups national technological capabilities into human cap-
ital, physical investment and technological effort. All of these are needed,
as economic growth rises from the interplay of all these different capabilities
and incentives within an institutional framework.
North (1990) argues that institutions are the underlying determinant of the
long run performance of economics. He characterizes institutions as con-
structs of human mind, which cannot be measured. Institutions exist due to
uncertainties involved in human interaction, and are essentially constraints to
structure interaction. North stresses that institutions determine the kind of
economic activities that will be profitable and viable, and shape the adaptive
efficiency of the internal structures of firms and other organizations by, for
instance, regulating entry to market, governance structures and the flexibil-
ity of organizations. North also believes that institutions exhibit increasing
returns, i.e. that it will always be economically profitable to improve insti-
tutions.
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) introduced the term “absorptive capacity” to
describe the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new external infor-
mation, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends. They argue that
absorptive capacity is crucial for the firm’s innovative capabilities. They did
not take the concept to national level.
“Social capital” also describes an important form of capabilities. There is a
large literature and differing views on this concept alone, but many are willing
to accept the approach employed by Woolcock (1998). He defined social
capital as the “nature and extent of a community’s personal and institutional
relationships”. High levels of social capital nurture a sustainable, equitable
and participatory economic development. Rather than defining conditions
which increase social capital, Woolcock proposes a set of conditions which
undermine it. These include, for instance, widespread inequalities of any
kind, endemic poverty, weak or unjust laws, lack of democracy and situations
which undermine the basic sense of order and predictability, such as war.
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Hall and Jones (1999) introduced a new term, “social infrastructure”, which
they used to describe institutions and government policies, which determine
the economic environment within which individuals accumulate skills, and
firms accumulate capital and produce output. They name social institu-
tions which protect the output of individual productive units from diversion
(such as thievery or mafia protection) an integral part of good social infras-
tructure. Overall a good social infrastructure should provide an environment
that supports productive activities and encourages capital accumulation, skill
acquisition, invention and technology transfer.
Furman et al. (2002) suggested the term “national innovative capacity” to
describe the ability of a country to produce and commercialize a flow of in-
novative technology over the long term. They claim that national innovative
capacity is determined by the strength of a country’s common innovation in-
frastructure, the environment for innovation in a country’s industrial clusters,
and the strength of linkages between these two. The innovation infrastructure
includes things like the country’s overall science and technology policy envi-
ronment, the mechanisms in place for supporting basic research and higher
education, and the cumulative stock of technological knowledge upon which
new ideas are developed and commercialized.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) suggest that the main determinant of differ-
ences in prosperity across countries are differences in “economic institutions”,
which are collective choices and an outcome of a political process. Robinson
and Acemoglu (2012) claim that poverty traps are a result of self-enforcing
low quality institutions.
Based on the preceding literature, Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) attempted
to create an integrated framework of the various concepts of capabilities.
This framework is presented in Figure 2.1. All of the overviewed concepts
are not included with their original names, but due to overlapping formula-
tions the framework manages to catch the essence of most of them. Social
capital and social infrastructure can be thought to be included in broadly
defined institutions, Hirschman’s social overhead capital is spread in institu-
tions, social capabilities and technological capabilities. National innovative
capacity is included in the technological capabilities.
It is noteworthy that literature uses these terms often broadly and inter-
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Figure 2.1: An integrated framework of capabilities by Fagerberg and Srholec
(2008).
changeably. To distinguish from the above-given definitions, we shall adopt
yet another new term, societal capabilities, to cover all of the introduced
aspects.
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2.2.2 Empirical results on capabilities and growth
The abstract nature of many aspects of capabilities pose challenges for mea-
suring, but there is a large empirical literature that shows societal capabilities
to be important for growth.
As Figure 2.1 presents, Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) offer also a selection of
aspects of capabilities that can be measured and used as indicators. They
did a a factor analysis on a number of indicators for 115 countries and iden-
tified four dimensions, for which the indicators within the dimension are
strongly correlated. Based on the indicators that are included in these syn-
thetic dimensions, they called them the innovation system, the quality of
governance, the character of the political system and the degree of openness
of the economy. Innovation systems and good governance were shown to be
closely correlated with economic growth, while political system and openness
had little effect. Later Fagerberg and Srholec (2016) repeated the exercise
for regional level in Europe and showed that the close connection between
capability building and economic performance also holds for regions. This
time technological capabilities, education, access to ICT and good governance
emerged as dimensions from the factor analysis.
Also institutions and social capital have been shown to correlate with eco-
nomic growth (Easterly et al., 2006; Guiso et al., 2004). Formal institutions
and social capital have in fact been shown to substitute each other to a
certain extent: Easterly et al. (2006) found that good institutions are most
necessary and beneficial where there are ethnolinguistic divisions and social
capital is in shorter supply, and Guiso et al. (2004) showed that social capital
matters more for financial development when education levels are low and
law enforcement is weak. However, formal institutions and social capital are
also complements and reinforce each other: Knack and Keefer (1997) dis-
covered that trust and civic norms, used as a proxy for social capital, are
stronger in nations with higher and more equal incomes, with good insti-
tutions, and with better-educated and ethnically homogeneous populations.
Easterly et al. (2006) found that income equality and ethnic homogeneity
endogenously determine institutional quality, which in turn determines eco-
nomic growth.
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Dawson (1998) studied two different mechanisms, through which capabilities
could have an effect: a direct effect on total factor productivity and an
indirect effect through increasing investment. They showed that economic
freedom enhances growth through both channels. However, political and
civil liberties seemed to have no direct effect on growth and there was mixed
evidence that they may affect investment. Hall and Jones (1999) documented
that the cross-country differences in capital accumulation, productivity, and
therefore output per worker can be explained by differences in institutions
and government policies.
“Physical” capabilities have been shown to be of importance as well. De-
murger (2001) found that the geographical location and infrastructure en-
dowment account significantly for observed differences in growth performance
across Chinese provinces. Lipscomb et al. (2013) documented large positive
effects of electrification on development, and concluded that broad-based im-
provement in labor productivity across sectors and regions appeared to be
the likely mechanism by which the development gains were realized. Ozturk
(2010) found that electricity seems to be a limiting factor to economic growth
and, hence, shocks to energy supply can be expected have a negative impact
on economic growth.
2.2.3 Accumulation of capabilities
The literature strongly agrees that capabilities are endogenously determined
and therefore path-dependent.
North (1990) argues that institutions determine the structure of an economy,
which fosters the accumulation of certain kills and knowledge, which will
shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) see that the economic institutions of a society
depend on the nature of political institutions and the distribution of political
power in the society, which in turn are dependent on economic outcomes.
Because the politically powerful have incentives to support such political
institutions and through them such economic institutions that keep them in
power, reforming institutions can be difficult.
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Empirical research supports this. Glaeser et al. (2004) showed that good
policies (e.g. secure rights to private property) are a driver of growth in
economies, which causes growth in education, and subsequently improves
political institutions. Dawson (1998) found that economic and civil liberties
increase human capital investment. Moreover, economic performance affects
institutional change: economic growth promotes economic freedom. Knack
and Keefer (1997) showed that secondary education is associated with trust
and therefore social capital, although they could not determine the direction
of causality.
Hirschman (1958) theorizes that development consists of subsequent invest-
ments in social overhead capital (SOC) and directly productive activities
(DPA). He claims that there is a minimum level of SOC required for a cer-
tain level of DPA, and development can happen via shortage or via excess
capacity of SOC. Development via shortage means that investments in DPA
create a demand for increased SOC to push down the costs of production.
Development via excess means that investment in SOC invites new DPA.
Either way, it only makes sense to relatively incrementally increase either
investment to keep the investment costs at bay, resulting in gradual, path-
dependent increases of capabilities and production.
Lall (1992) suggests that the building of national capabilities starts at the
firm-level: demand for new firm-level technological capabilities is simply a
result of the need for new skills to put new technologies into production. Of
course, external factors that affect the perceived return on capabilities invest-
ment, such as the macroeconomic and institutional environment, are seen to
affect this demand. The ability to acquire new capabilities depends on the
firm’s access to skills, technical goods, information and support. Cohen and
Levinthal (1990) advocate that the absorptive capacity is largely a function
of the firm’s level of prior related knowledge, which creates path dependence.
They argue that a lack of investment in an area of expertise early on may
foreclose the future development of a technical capability in that area.
Fagerberg and Srholec (2016) empirically found specialization in knowledge-
intensive activities to be positively associated with both regional economic
performance and the capabilities that underpin it (technological capabilities,
education, access to ICT and good governance). But from their data they
could not tell if the capabilities came first and enabled the advanced produc-
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tion activities, or if the capabilities were built as a result of the expansion of
advanced production activities, or a bit of both.
.
2.3 Structural change
Structural change generally refers to the reallocation of economic activity
across the aggregate sectors of agriculture, manufacturing and services. It is
a robust ongoing phenomenon accompanying economic growth. The stylized
facts include a decrease in both the employment share and the (nominal and
real) value added share of agriculture, an increase in the employment and the
value added share of services and a hump-shaped pattern of first increasing
and then decreasing employment and value added share of manufacturing
as the GDP grows. In addition, the employment share and the value added
share of services are bounded away from zero, and for poor countries the
employment share of agriculture is larger than the value added share, i.e.
most of the population is employed in agriculture even though it has the
lowest total factor productivity (Herrendorf et al., 2014).
The stylized facts of economic growth in general include a roughly con-
stant growth rate of output per worker over time, a roughly constant cap-
ital/output ratio, a roughly constant rate of return to capital and roughly
constant shares of capital and labor in net income. These are also known as
the Kaldor facts of growth (Herrendorf et al., 2014).
2.3.1 The importance of industrialization
Industrialization refers to the phase in structural change when the manufac-
turing sector absorbs large quantities of labor from agriculture and the value
added share of manufacturing rises. Historically industrialization has been
the key element that has enabled rapid and sustained economic growth rates,
with the exception of some economies that are very rich in natural resources
(Rodrik, 2014).
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Rodrik (2014) attributes the importance of industrialization to two things.
First, manufacturing has the possibility of absorbing large quantities of rela-
tively unskilled labor, partly due to the tradable nature of the goods, which
frees manufacturing from the constraints of the domestic demand. Even if
there would be no total factor productivity growth in manufacturing, simply
the relocation of labor to these activities would raise the average produc-
tivity of the economy, as the productivity of agriculture tends to be lower
than that of manufacturing. Second, the total factor productivity growth in
manufacturing is in fact significant. Manufacturing industries exhibit strong
unconditional convergence in labor productivity, i.e. the productivity of spe-
cific manufacturing sectors in different countries converges despite various
differences in circumstances. Rodrik (2013) documented this unconditional
convergence at various levels of disaggregation for a large sample covering
more than 100 countries over recent decades. This is a remarkable finding,
because like we mentioned in section 2.2.1, economies as a whole converge
only conditionally.
Moreover, Rodrik (2014) remarks that many manufacturing industries can
operate even in the presence of a low level of societal capabilities, such as bad
governance and lousy policies. He argues that these properties suggest that
“formal manufacturing industries are natural ‘escalator’ industries that tend
to propel an economy forward”. However, he stresses this does not denigrate
the role of good policies or favorable external circumstances, as countries
with better institutions and policies will experience faster convergence.
Nevertheless, Rodrik (2014) emphasizes that the industrialization process is
not automatic but fraught with government and market failures. The labor
productivity convergence is robust and happens in all manufacturing indus-
tries, but all economies do not manage rapid industrialization, i.e. the mov-
ing of significant shares of labor to manufacturing. There is even evidence of
“premature deindustrialization”, i.e. structural change that is going “back-
wards”. It is well known that developed countries deindustrialize as the share
of services rises, but for the recent decades Rodrik (2016) documented a sig-
nificant deindustrialization trend also outside the post-industrial economies,
with Asian countries being an exception. McMillan et al. (2014) showed that
since 1990 labor has been moving from high- to low-productivity sectors in
Latin America and until 2000 also in Africa. They attribute these trends to
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international trade and globalization, which indicates that structural change
is vulnerable to outside influences.
2.3.2 Structural change and capabilities
Rodrik (2014) handled the development of capabilities and structural change
as largely separate phenomena, but recognized that the social value of in-
vestments directed to expanding manufacturing activities greatly exceeds the
private value. This is because the expansion of manufacturing activities in
low-income environments induces various externalities and spillovers, includ-
ing demonstration effects for prospective entrants, training labor that can be
employed elsewhere, providing inputs and demand for other activities that
may not have otherwise started, and perhaps most importantly, generating
technical learning that spills over to other actors. We could call this building
capabilities.
The idea that the expansion of productive activities provides inputs and de-
mand for other activities resonates with Hirschman (1958), who introduced
a famous theory of backward and forward linkages between industries. Ac-
cording to him, every activity that does not by its nature cater exclusively
to final demands will induce attempts to utilize its outputs as inputs in
some new activities, creating a forward linkage, and other attempts to fulfill
its demands for inputs, creating a backward linkage. He did not explicitly
formulate how the linkage theory and his vision of social overhead capital
interact, but we could imagine that the linkages describe the development of
directly productive activities, given that the necessary investments in social
overhead capital are made. Hausmann and Hidalgo (2010) suggest that we
could also understand the backward and forward linkages through capabili-
ties. A forward linkage would be a provision of capability that promotes the
development of a new product or industry. A backward linkage would be
a demand for a new capability that emerges when a producer attempts to
make a new product that needs it.
Others too believe that capabilities are crucial enablers of diversification into
new productive activities and that learning from new productive activities
builds more capabilities. Bell and Pavitt (1995) argue that the accumula-
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tion of technological capabilities opens up opportunities for diversification
into related products and new industries. They discuss that historically the
technological development paths of today’s developed countries were based
on cumulative knowledge and experience. Improving personal and organi-
zational skills along with related institutional structures enabled countries
gradually to adopt and develop process and product technologies of increas-
ing complexity. Over time the learning processes laid the groundwork for
production in other sectors. They also argue that the accumulated knowl-
edge and expertise could be transferred to enhance the productivity in other
firms and sectors. However, they stress that without government policy the
economy will underinvest in capabilities.
This interaction idea is supported by empirical research, which has recently
investigated structural change at a much more detailed level than the tradi-
tional three sectors of agriculture, manufacturing and services.
Hausmann and Klinger (2006) approached structural change through export
data. They measured the relatedness between pairs of products based on the
probability that countries in the world effectively export both, and used these
measures of “proximity” to build a network of products, which they call the
“product space”. The proximity of products is assumed to signal how similar
the capabilities needed to produce these products are. Hausmann and Klinger
showed that the product space is very heterogeneous, with some areas being
very dense and others quite sparse. They also found robust evidence that the
speed of structural transformation will depend on the density of the product
space near the area where a country is currently a strong exporter. Hidalgo
et al. (2007) also studied the product space and found that most upscale
products are located in a densely connected core while lower income products
occupy a less connected periphery. This implies that higher income countries
are able to upgrade their exports basket more quickly, while low-income
countries have difficulties adapting the technology, capital, institutions and
skills needed to make new products from the products they are currently
producing.
Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) constructed measures describing the complex-
ity of a country’s economy based on how diversified and how “ubiquitous”
its exports are. They defined ubiquity by how many other countries export
the same products. They showed that their measures of complexity corre-
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late with the country’s income and that deviations from this relationship are
predictive of future growth. They theorize the complexity to in fact mea-
sure the availability of capabilities, or “non-tradable inputs”, in the country.
These ideas are in line with the findings of Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), who
discovered robust patterns in the evolution of sectoral concentration, show-
ing that countries diversify their production as they develop until they reach
approximately the development level of current Ireland, which is when they
start to specialize again.
Radebach et al. (2016) analyzed structural change on a disaggregated level
using value-added data from 57 sectors. They also used a network approach,
building on the concept of the product space. Their network is based on inter-
sector similarities, i.e. if two sectors are simultaneously relatively strong
in the same group of regions and relatively weak in another group, they
are considered to be positively related. They found “communities” that
can be characterized as the well-known aggregated sectors of agriculture,
industry and resource extraction, but in addition they discovered what they
call “directed bridging sectors”, mainly light manufacturing, that connect the
agriculture community to the industrial one. They showed that countries
are only likely to move to sectors that are close to what they are already
producing, effectively making the bridges bottlenecks in the transition from
an agrarian economy to an industrialized one. Radebach et al. hypothesize
that the bridges foster the building of capabilities that are necessary for
engaging in more complex activities.
2.3.3 Structural change, capabilities and climate policy
It is seems worthwhile to consider the possibility that economic development
arises from the interplay of structural change and growing societal capabili-
ties, two widely documented phenomena to accompany growth.
This raises a question. Could climate policy interfere with structural change?
Because if it did, developing countries might have difficulties in building the
capabilities that they need in order to successfully adopt more advanced,
“cleaner” technology and to continue expanding their productive activities
to more complex goods. This could undermine their development.
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The bridging sectors identified by Radebach et al. (2016) offer a likely can-
didate for a place where a disturbance to structural change could have detri-
mental effects to development. If light manufacturing truly is a bottleneck
and no other alternative routes to industrialization naturally emerge, devel-
oping countries could be in trouble.
Climate policy could harm the bridges in different ways. Rising energy prices
(due to emissions taxes, expensive emission permits or a shift to low-carbon
energy sources) or taxes on emission-intensive goods could harm their com-
petitiveness against similar products produced in more advanced countries
with cleaner energy or technology. Performance standards and mandated
abatement technologies could raise the capabilities that are required to op-
erate the bridging sectors themselves. Appreciation of the national currency
due to the inflow of international climate finance could harm the competi-
tiveness of exports (Jakob et al., 2015). If the capabilities that the bridging
sectors need or normally develop involve energy intensive capital goods like
infrastructure, rising energy prices could divert investments away from them
(Jakob and Steckel, 2014).
The next section examines economic models that incorporate some aspects
of capabilities or structural change.
2.4 Related economic models
2.4.1 Endogenous growth theory
The neoclassical model of Solow (1956), also known as the most popular
example of the exogenous growth theory, allows for long-term growth only
via exogenously determined technological progress. As opposed to this, en-
dogenous growth theory, known also as the new growth theory, understands
technological progress as an endogenous phenomenon. Generally endoge-
nous growth models create growth through externalities on human capital or
knowledge, which we can understand as the development of capabilities.
One of the most famous models in this area is the one by Romer (1986).
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In his model, growth is driven by the accumulation of knowledge via two
key features: knowledge spillovers and increasing returns to knowledge. The
creation of new knowledge by one firm is assumed to have a positive external
effect on the production possibilities of other firms, as knowledge cannot be
perfectly patented or kept secret. To describe this, the production function of
the model includes both firm-specific knowledge ki and the aggregate knowl-
edge in the economy K =
∑
i ki as input factors. The production function
takes the form F (ki, K,xi), where xi describes all the other input factors,
which for simplicity are assumed to be in fixed supply. Most importantly,
the production function as a whole exhibits increasing returns. For any Ψ > 1
F (Ψki,ΨK,Ψxi) > F (Ψki, K,Ψxi) = ΨF (ki, K,xi).
This model features only one state variable, knowledge, and one control vari-
able, the invested share of production. The stock of knowledge can be in-
creased by forgoing some consumption and investing in research, which pro-
duces new knowledge as a function of investment and the existing stock of
knowledge. However, the growth rate of knowledge is bounded from above
and the investors only take into account their private gain. These features
allow for a competitive equilibrium solution, which is suboptimal from the
social point of view due to the presence of externalities.
Another famous endogenous growth model is that of Lucas (1988). In his
formulations, the accumulation of human capital drives growth. Lucas ex-
amines two alternative models, representing the extremes for human capital
accumulation. The first and more famous model features the possibility to
invest in human capital by withdrawing time from production, like by going
to school instead of working. New human capital is formed as function of
the fraction of time devoted to education, and the existing human capital in
the economy. Like in the Romer (1986) model, there is a maximum growth
rate for human capital, but this is only reached when all available time is
devoted to increasing human capital. The productivity of capital and labor
are enhanced by human capital - both the human capital employed by the
particular producer as well as the general average level of human capital
in the economy, which induces increasing returns. Because the producers
gain advantages from the general level of human capital but only the private
gains are considered in the investment decisions, the competitive equilibrium
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is suboptimal. This model is rather similar to that of Romer (1986), except
that it includes two state variables, physical capital and human capital, and
two control variables, the time devoted to education instead of production
and the share of production invested in capital instead of consuming it.
The second model by Lucas (1988) produces human capital through learning-
by-doing. For this model economy Lucas introduced two differing goods,
which can be produced as a function of good-specific human capital and the
share of labor time devoted this good (Lucas omits physical capital for this
model for simplicity). The production of a good i accumulates the good-
specific human capital as a spillover. The difference between the goods is
how efficiently they accumulate human capital. This model only features a
static optimization problem, the labor time allocation for either good, and
the choice depends on the substitutability of the goods in the consumer’s
preferences. In the absence of capital accumulation and with purely external
human capital accumulation, the consumer has no intertemporal tradeoffs to
decide on. Due to the external human capital accumulation, the equilibrium
is again suboptimal.
In order for the model to feature endogenous growth, learning-by-doing can-
not have diminishing returns, which would make human capital lose its status
as the engine for growth. Lucas (1988) recognizes that this seems to violate
the diminishing productivity growth of particular products that studies have
observed. To solve the issue, he interprets the dynamics to stand for two in-
dustries, in a situation where new products are constantly introduced within
an industry, the diminishing returns to learning apply to each of them sep-
arately, and human capital specialized to old products is inherited by new
products. Consumers only have demand for the industry output in general.
This model in fact features a kind of structural change between these two
industries. The direction of change depends on the preferences of the con-
sumer. If the goods are substitutes, more and more time will be devoted
to the good with more efficient human capital accumulation abilities. If the
goods are complements, the opposite is true.
Endogenous growth theory offers good aggregate-level dynamics, where ca-
pabilities are the engine for growth. Some of the features are especially ap-
pealing from our point of view: increasing returns to capabilities, the ability
of other producers to utilize the capabilities that others have created and the
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creation of capabilities through learning-by-doing. However, these models do
not consider the interaction between structural change and capabilities.
2.4.2 Models of structural change and capabilities
Herrendorf et al. (2014) overviewed the recent advances in the research on
structural change and concluded that models of structural change are mostly
concerned with replicating the stylized facts of structural change and deliv-
ering “generalized balanced growth”, i.e. that all aggregate variables, like
the GDP, the capital stock and the wages, grow at the same constant rate
- which means that the Kaldor facts hold. The models usually include the
three aggregate sectors that produce differentiated goods: agriculture, man-
ufacturing and services. Structural change in these models is driven either
by differing externally given rates of total factor productivity growth or by
non-homothetic preferences of consumers, i.e. that the preferences change
when consumers get wealthier. Other than incorporating more sectors, they
are usually based on the one-sector neoclassical model of Solow (1956) and
do not exhibit endogenous growth. Examples of these models include those
of Herrendorf et al. (2014), Kongsamut et al. (2001) and Ngai and Pissarides
(2007), except that Ngai and Pissarides (2007) modeled an arbitrary number
of sectors.
There are however some models that incorporate some aspects of both capa-
bilities and structural change.
Tamura (2002) provided a model where human capital accumulation causes
the economy to switch from “agriculture” to “industry”, which both pro-
duce the same good, but with different technologies. Agricultural technology
utilizes land and human capital and exhibits decreasing returns. Industry
uses only human capital as an input and features constant returns to scale.
Human capital can be accumulated by parents investing time in their chil-
dren, who receive human capital in proportion to the parent’s. Eventually
when enough human capital is accumulated, it becomes profitable to start
producing with the industrial technology.
Rodrik (2007) took a different approach to sectors: he classified them as
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“importables” (industries that competes with imports), “non-traditional ex-
portables” (industries that can compete in the world market), “traditional
exportables” (e.g. raw materials) and “non-tradables” (like most services).
Each sector uses labor as the only input, and all except non-tradables exhibit
decreasing returns. The central idea behind the model is that growth is driven
through learning-by-doing in the “modern” importables and non-traditional
exportables sectors. The production in these modern sectors raises their own
productivity, which drives growth. The other sectors experience no produc-
tivity growth.
Parente and Prescott (1994) focused on technology adoption and barriers to
such adoptions. They assumed that to adopt a new technology, the firm must
make an investment. The required investment depends on the level of general
knowledge in the world and the barriers to adoption in the country where
the firm is located. The larger these barriers, the greater the investment
the firm must make to adopt a more advanced technology, and the more
knowledge there is, the smaller the required investment. However, the growth
of knowledge and the size of the barriers are given exogenously and they do
not interact with development.
Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) provided a one-agent Bayesian model of learning-
by-doing and technology choice. The more the agent uses a technology, the
better he learns to use it, and the more productive he gets. Any given tech-
nology has bounded productivity, which means that the agent needs to keep
switching to better technologies in order to keep his productivity growing.
But a switch of technologies results in temporary reduction of expertise: the
bigger is the technological leap, the bigger the loss in expertise.
Hausmann and Hidalgo (2010) developed a “binomial” model that assumes
each product to require a potentially large number of non-tradable inputs, i.e.
capabilities, and that a country can only make the products for which it has
all the requisite capabilities. The more capabilities a country has, the more
products it can produce and therefore the more diversified it is. Because they
assume that products need on average a lot of capabilities, countries with few
capabilities will gain access to few if any new products when they acquire
a new capability. Countries in possession of already many capabilities will
likely unlock many new products with one additional capability. This model
is static, i.e. includes no dynamics and provides no explanations to how
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capabilities are accumulated. When considering their results, we should keep
in mind that their assumptions are based on export data. On a domestic level
the returns to new capabilities may not be as negligible for poor countries.
Another shortcoming of this approach is that it doesn’t consider that some
capabilities can substitute each other to some extent, as documented for
social capital and formal institutions by Easterly et al. (2006) and for social
capital, education and law enforcement by Guiso et al. (2004).
Ferrarini and Scaramozzino (2016) developed an endogenous growth model
where increased complexity raises the rate of economic growth through en-
hanced human capital accumulation. They assume a uniformly distributed
continuum of sectors that differ in their complexity. Each country has an
exogenously given distribution of activities in these sectors, represented by a
fixed average complexity parameter. Human capital is developed as a func-
tion of time devoted to education, the existing stock of human capital and the
given average complexity of the economy. Accumulating human capital will
increase productivity, but the economy will not move to different activities
as it develops.
To summarize, the literature simply lacks an endogenous growth model that
is (1) consistent with the stylized facts of growth, and (2) driven by the in-
terplay of the accumulation of capabilities and the ongoing structural change
and diversification of the economy. There are interesting approaches and
ideas, including the less-advanced sector enabling the move to the next sec-
tor through the accumulation of some form of human capital, the barriers
to adaptation making investments in advanced technology more expensive,
the bounded productivities of single sectors, the products’ prerequisites of
capabilities and the economic complexity enhancing human capital accumu-
lation. However, the specific modeling techniques used to execute these ideas
are not very compelling for our purpose.
Chapter 3
Multi-sector endogenous growth
model
Mathematical models are an integral part of economics and the most common
way of presenting economic theories. Models are an important thinking aid,
because they allow one to examine complicated chains of cause and effect,
and provide a template for logical experiments to produce different scenarios
and to evaluate the effect of different policies.
This chapter introduces a multi-sector growth model, in which growth is
driven by the interplay of endogenous diversification, structural change and
the accumulation of capabilities. This chapter starts by introducing the
“building blocks” of the model in relation to existing literature. It then
presents the model, analyzes its behaviour and considers what the framework
implies for the introduction of climate policy.
3.1 Building blocks
This model utilizes well established modeling assumptions from the economic
literature. These include (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004):
1. The division of the economic actors into producers and households, which
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are represented by so-called representative firms and representative house-
holds. The concept of a representative firm assumes that all firms represented
by the firm have access to the same production function and can convert
production factors to final goods with the same efficiency. The concept of
a representative household assumes that the demand side of the economy
can be represented as if there was a single household making the aggregate
consumption decisions.
2. Perfect competition, essentially meaning that all producers are price-
takers. They cannot affect the market prices of their inputs or the market
price of their output, which equals the unit cost of production. This follows
from the assumptions that all firms have a small market share and there are
no barriers to entry or exit.
3. Households own all “private” production factors, labor and capital, and
rent them to firms, for which they receive compensation in the form of wages
and interest, i.e. rental income on capital. This is equivalent to assuming
that firms own the capital and households own the stock of the firms, only
simpler.
4. Demand and investment decisions are taken by a representative household
that maximizes its utility over an infinite time horizon. While the life of an
individual might be finite, individuals are assumed to equally care about the
well-being of their descendants. These optimization problems are solved with
dynamic optimization tools.
4. Existence of a public good, which is something that is non-rivalrous, i.e. it
can be used without reducing its availability to others, and non-excludable,
i.e. nobody can be prevented from using it. In our model, capabilities are a
public good.
5. Existence of positive externalities, which occur when an action creates
benefits for others who cannot be charged for receiving the benefit. A posi-
tive spillover is a related term, but does not imply that the spillover is not
compensated for. In our model, we assume capabilities to accumulate as a
spillover from investment in new production sectors. Capabilities are also
an externality of investment, because other producers can utilize the created
capabilities and do not pay for them.
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The solution to a dynamic model at every point in time is called the compet-
itive equilibrium. It is reached when the households maximize their utility
over an infinite horizon and firms maximize their profits at any given time.
An optimal or Pareto optimal solution is reached when nobody’s utility can
be improved without decreasing someone else’s. In the presence of exter-
nalities, these solutions will not coincide. In economic models, the Pareto
optimal solution is found as a solution the optimization problem of social
planner, who takes into account all dynamics, including externalities.
The behavior of the model over time is usually of most interest. A balanced
growth path is the goal of most models, meaning that all variables grow at
the same constant rate, except for the interest rate, which stays constant.
A balanced growth path is consistent with the Kaldor facts of economic
growth. A generalized balanced growth path is a term used for models that
include structural change. It means that the aggregate variables grow at a
constant rate, but the variables describing specific sectors do not. When the
model economies are not initially on a balanced growth path, how they get
there is described by transitional dynamics.
This model borrows its general spirit from Romer (1986), in the sense that
capabilities are included in the production function and they cause the pro-
duction function to exhibit increasing returns, which enables endogenous
growth. The model uses a Cobb-Douglas production function like most other
economic models. Unlike most models, this model includes multiple sectors,
one producing investment goods and all others producing consumption goods,
following Jensen and Larsen (2005) and Ngai and Pissarides (2007). How-
ever, the sectors differ not in terms of exogenous productivity growth rates
but in terms of subsistence levels of capabilities. Not all of them produce
at all times; the accumulation of capabilities opens up possibilities for di-
versification. This is a unique feature. Another unique feature is how the
accumulation of capabilities is modeled as a spillover from investment in new
sectors, discussed in detail in section 3.2.3.
Capabilities are measured with a one-dimensional index. This is obviously
a departure from the key feature of variety, but it is how capabilities are
measured to track and compare the performance of countries. Archibugi and
Coco (2005) compared the recently developed measures of capabilities by the
World Economic Forum, the UN Development Program, the UN Industrial
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Development Organization and the RAND Corporation. All of them measure
capabilities by summing together various statistics describing the different
aspects of capabilities.
It is worth noting that economists tend to define “sectors” according to
whatever is relevant for their objectives, which was also seen in the models
in section 2.4. So does this model, as it differentiates between the sectors in
terms of their requirements for capabilities. This implies that in the model
some distinguished real-world sectors that produce different products but
have the same requirements for capabilities are aggregated as one. This
might for instance be the case for manufacturing food-products and manu-
facturing beverages, which are classified as separate sectors according to the
International Standard Industrial Classifications of the United Nations, but
perhaps require similar underlying capabilities.
The demand side of the model is more conventional. The representative
household has constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences for dif-
ferent goods and a logarithmic time preference, following Acemoglu (2008) in
chapter 13.4, except that in our model goods are discrete instead of a contin-
uum. These preferences imply that the consumption decisions depend only
on relative prices. All prices are therefore normalized using the investment
good as the numeraire, i.e. all prices are expressed in terms of this good,
following Herrendorf et al. (2014) and Ngai and Pissarides (2007).
This model features two state variables, the capital stock and the level of
capabilities, which uniquely describe the “state” of the system. They can be
guided with one control variable, consumption. Mulligan and Sala-i Martin
(1993) provide help for analyzing the transitional dynamics of such a system
with two state variables.
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3.2 Construction of the model economy
3.2.1 Production
We consider an economy consisting of N sectors. Firms operating in each sec-
tor have constant returns to scale in terms of the private inputs, labor L and
capital K. In addition each firm requires various societal capabilities, repre-
sented by a capability index G, for production, leading to overall increasing
returns. Each sector i admits a representative firm with a Cobb-Douglas
production function
Yi(t) = Fi(Li(t), Ki(t), Ai(t), G(t))
= Ai(t)Li(t)
1−αiKi(t)αi(G(t)−G0i)βi ∀i ∈ [1, N ]. (3.1)
Here Yi(t) ≥ 0 is the amount of units of output, not to be mixed with
revenue, which is represented by the product of the output unit price and the
produced units of output, Pi(t)Yi(t). Ai(t) ≥ 0 is a sector-specific coefficient
that augments the need of either labor or capital to produce a unit of output,
also referred to as the (sector-specific) level of technology. Li(t) ≥ 0 is the
employed labor and Ki(t) ≥ 0 is the employed capital in sector i at time t.
0 < αi < 1 is the sectoral output elasticity of capital and 0 < βi < 1 is the
sectoral output elasticity of societal capabilities G(t) ≥ 0 above the minimum
necessary level of G0i ≥ 0. If G(t) ≤ G0i, the sector is not producing and
Yi(t) = Li(t) = Ki(t) = 0.
The representative firms are assumed to operate under perfect competition,
and therefore take the unit input prices for labor and capital (W (t), R(t))
as given and sell their output at unit cost Pi(t). The societal capabilities
are considered to be a public good, and therefore the firm does not pay to
use them. The firms maximize their profits at each timepoint, and con-
sequently choose the employed amounts of capital and labor so that the
marginal productivity of labor (MPLi(t) = ∂Yi(t)/∂Li(t)) multiplied by the
output price equals the wage rate, and the marginal productivity of capital
(MPKi(t) = ∂Yi(t)/∂Ki(t)) multiplied by the output price equals the capital
rental rate
W (t) = Pi(t)MPLi(t), (3.2)
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R(t) = Pi(t)MPKi(t). (3.3)
Because the output is sold at unit cost, the revenue of the firm equals the
total costs,
Pi(t)Yi(t) = W (t)Li(t) +R(t)Ki(t). (3.4)
For calculations see appendix A.1.
Following Herrendorf et al. (2014), one of the sectors is assumed to produce
investment goods for all the rest of the economy while all the other sectors
are assumed to produce differentiated consumption goods which fall into all
of the broad categories of agricultural, manufacturing and service goods. The
amount of consumption good sectors producing at time t is denoted by n(t),
and the investment sector is denoted by x. Formally,
n(t) = #{i | G(t) > G0i & i 6= x}. (3.5)
The investment sector is assumed to always be producing, so we set G0x = 0.
All in all n(t) + 1 sectors operate at time t. All of the output will be utilized,
so that we have
Yi(t) = Ci(t) ∀i ∈ [1, n(t)], (3.6)
Yx(t) = X(t), (3.7)
where Ci(t) is the total consumption of good i at time t. The demands for
the consumption goods Ci(t) and the investment goods X(t) are determined
by households, who can spend their income either on consumption or on
investment in capital through the investment goods they buy from sector x.
Therefore the households own all of the capital and rent it out to the firms
at the rental rate R(t). Investment goods accumulate capital according to
K˙(t) = X(t)− δK(t), (3.8)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
Because only the relative prices matter, following Herrendorf et al. (2014)
the investment good is chosen as the numeraire and all prices are obtained
relative to that. The price of good i relative to the investment good is defined
as
pi(t) =
Pi(t)
Px(t)
∀i ∈ [1, N ]. (3.9)
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Using equations (3.2) and (3.3) we get the relative prices as the relations
between the marginal productivities of labor and capital,
pi(t) =
MPKx(t)
MPKi(t)
=
MPLx(t)
MPLi(t)
∀i ∈ [1, N ]. (3.10)
The relative price of the investment good is therefore always 1. The wage
rate and the capital rental rate are also denoted in terms of investment goods,
w(t) =
W (t)
Px(t)
= pi(t)MPLi(t) = MPLx(t), (3.11)
r(t) =
R(t)
Px(t)
= pi(t)MPKi(t) = MPKx(t). (3.12)
3.2.2 Household preferences
We consider the households to be infinitely lived dynasties, and the popu-
lation to be a constant L. We adopt a discrete-good version of the CES
preferences of Acemoglu (2008), chapter 13.4:
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt lnC(t)dt, (3.13)
where U is the utility of the household, ρ is the discount factor and C(t) is
the consumption index,
C(t) =
( n(t)∑
i=1
ci(t)
−1

) 
−1
, (3.14)
where ci(t) = Ci(t)/L is the per capita consumption of good i at time t.
This is also known as the love-for-variety utility function when  > 1, as
the utility of the household is then increased by the possibility to consume
a larger variety of goods. We will assume that  > 1. The budget constraint
for the household is
k˙(t) = (r(t)− δ)k(t) + w(t)−
n(t)∑
i=1
pi(t)ci(t), (3.15)
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where k(t) = K(t)/L, the capital stock per capita. The left hand side of the
equation shows the savings, i.e. new investment, and the right side shows
the net income from capital and wages minus the consumption expenditure
at time t. The per capita total consumption expenditure is denoted by
e(t) =
n(t)∑
i=1
ei(t) =
n(t)∑
i=1
pi(t)ci(t). (3.16)
Using equations (3.15) and (3.16) we get the accumulation rule for per capita
capital
k˙(t) = (r(t)− δ)k(t) + w(t)− e(t). (3.17)
Appendix A.2 solves the dynamic optimization problem of dividing income
into consumption and investment and yields the Euler equation
e˙(t)
e(t)
= r(t)− δ − ρ. (3.18)
Appendix A.2 also solves the static optimization problem of deciding how
much of each consumption good to consume and produces the rule
ci(t) =
pi(t)
−
P (t)1−
e(t), (3.19)
where P (t) is an ideal price index, as called by Acemoglu (2008), and defined
by equation (A.14) as
P (t) =
( n(t)∑
i=1
pi(t)
1−
) 1
1−
. (3.20)
To guarantee the optimality of the dynamic solution, this infinite horizon
optimization problem also requires a transversality condition
lim
t→∞
ν(t)k(t) = 0, (3.21)
where ν(t) is the costate variable.
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3.2.3 Accumulation of capabilities
We represent societal capabilities with a capability index G, and assume ca-
pabilities to accumulate as spillover effect from investment, especially invest-
ment in new production sectors. This could be considered to work through
a kind of a learning-by-doing mechanism, where the expansion of production
leads to the creation of productivity-enhancing knowledge, which then spills
over to other producers. Alternatively, we could think that the expansion
of production creates demand for new capabilities, like new infrastructure or
new institutions. In both cases it is natural to assume that investment in
new sectors is more efficient in producing this knowledge or demand - the
learning curve tends to be steeper when there is little experience in a partic-
ular task, and a new sector that has just the sufficient capabilities to operate
has a strong demand for more to be able to increase its productivity.
We assume that over relatively long time periods ∆t the accumulation of
capabilities can be described as a Cobb-Douglas type of function
∆G = (∆n)η
(∆k
B
)1−η
, (3.22)
where 1
B
> 0 describes the effective share of investments that contributes
towards capabilities. We assume B to be constant for this analysis. The
elasticity parameter η measures the responsiveness of the newly accumulated
capabilities to a change in the amount of new sectors and new investment.
Note that in the formulation of equation (3.22) we use per capita investments
∆k instead of total investments exceeding the investments to replace depre-
ciated capital ∆K. It is quite intuitive to think that to produce equivalent
capabilities, economies with differing population sizes need to invest rela-
tively similar amounts. Furthermore, the use of a per capita variable allows
us to avoid so-called scale effects, i.e. that an economy with a larger popu-
lation would exhibit a larger per capita growth rate than an economy with
a smaller population, all other things held equal, which is not supported by
empirical observations (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
Equation (3.22) displays reasonable properties: the returns to increasing
either factor are positive but diminishing and the “returns to scale” are
constant. These features are in line with our assumption that investments in
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new sectors create capabilities more efficiently than investments in the more
mature sectors. The more new sectors are opened, the larger is the share
of the investments likely directed to them. On the other hand, increasing
the amount of new sectors for a certain amount of investment is likely to
have diminishing returns in terms of capabilities, as the production becomes
increasingly marginal when the investment is divided between the sectors.
In the extreme situation, when no new investments are made or no new sec-
tors are opened, the capabilities do not grow according to equation (3.22). In
the case of zero investments, this seems intuitively reasonable. If new sectors
are absent, we can consider this to be acceptable only as an approximation
over quite long periods of time, when the existing sectors have had time to
mature, and their learning curves and their demand for new capabilities have
flattened. For smaller time scales equation (3.22) cannot be used due to the
discrete nature of the number of operating sectors. To describe the develop-
ment of G(t) in continuous time, we need to somehow approximate n˙(t) in
continuous time.
Figure 3.1: The number of sectors n(t) as a function of G(t).
Figure 3.1 illustrates the development of n(t) as a function of G(t). A linear
approximation of n(t) between the opening of successive sectors is indicated
by a dashed line and seems reasonable enough for our purpose: we could
assume that once we have reached the halfway between G0i and G0,i+1 we
are also halfway into starting production in sector i+1, and even though the
sector is not yet operating, we are going towards it. Therefore we approxi-
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mate
n˙(t) ≈ G˙(t)
f(t)
, (3.23)
where f(t) > 0 is the distance between the successive G0is in terms of G. We
can now write equation (3.22) for continuous time as
G˙(t) =
(G˙(t)
f(t)
)η( k˙(t)
B
)1−η
=
k˙(t)
Bf(t)
η
1−η
=
k˙(t)
d(t)
, (3.24)
where d(t) = Bf(t)
η
1−η .
3.2.4 Aggregate economy
This section combines the production and consumption sides of the economy
and derives the necessary equations to characterize the aggregate economy
and factor allocations following the framework of Jensen and Larsen (2005).
All labor and capital in the economy must be utilized. Sectoral allocations
of labor and capital satisfy
n(t)+1∑
i=1
Li(t) = L,
n(t)+1∑
i=1
Ki(t) = K(t). (3.25)
National income Y (t) is defined as the total of sectoral producer revenues.
Following from equations (3.4), (3.11), (3.12) and (3.25), it is equivalent to
total factor income
Y (t) =
n(t)∑
i=1
pi(t)Yi(t) +X(t) = w(t)L+ r(t)K(t). (3.26)
The by far mostly used measure of economic development, the gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita, is in this economy defined as
y(t) =
Y (t)
L
= w(t) + r(t)k(t). (3.27)
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Marginal rates of technical substitution in each sector are by definition
ωi(t) =
MPLi(t)
MPKi(t)
=
1− αi
αi
ki(t) = ωi(ki(t)), (3.28)
which are positive monotonic functions in sectoral capital-labor ratio ki(t) =
Ki(t)/Li(t). There is free mobility of labor and capital between the sec-
tors, which imposes a common marginal rate of technical substitution for all
sectors,
ωi(t) = ω(t). (3.29)
We define the factor allocation fractions
λLi(t) =
Li(t)
L
∀i ∈ [1, n(t) + 1],
n(t)+1∑
i=1
λLi(t) = 1, (3.30)
λKi(t) =
Ki(t)
K(t)
∀i ∈ [1, n(t) + 1],
n(t)+1∑
i=1
λKi(t) = 1. (3.31)
As shown in the appendix A.3 the factor allocation fractions are given by
λLi(t) =
(1− αi)ei(t)
w(t)
∀i ∈ [1, n(t)], λLx(t) =
(1− αx)(y(t)− e(t))
w(t)
,
(3.32)
λKi(t) =
αiei(t)
r(t)k(t)
∀i ∈ [1, n(t)], λKx(t) =
αx(y(t)− e(t))
r(t)k(t)
. (3.33)
3.2.5 Assumptions
This section introduces assumptions which we make to make the model
tractable and to focus on the role of capabilities.
Assumption 1. There are no sector-specific technology differences or ad-
vancements over time, i.e. Ai(t) = A. We normalize A = 1.
We abstract from sectoral technological development to focus the analysis on
the role of capabilities.
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Assumption 2. The production functions exhibit constant returns to scale
in terms of capital and capabilities, i.e. βi = 1− αi.
Because we are interested in a model that exhibits balanced endogenous
growth, we focus on the special case where βi = 1 − αi, implying that the
production functions exhibit constant returns to scale for G(t) − G0i and
Ki(t) for a constant labor input Li(t). If we had βi < 1− αi, the production
functions would exhibit diminishing returns and endogenous growth would
not be possible in the long term. If βi > 1 − αi, we would have increasing
returns to scale and the growth rates would tend to rise over time.
Following Herrendorf et al. (2014) and several others we make also the fol-
lowing assumptions:
Assumption 3. The households can be represented as a unit mass; L = 1 ∀t.
This implies conveniently that the per capita variables equal the total vari-
ables, i.e. that Y (t) = y(t), K(t) = k(t), Yi(t) = Ci(t) = ci(t), pi(t)Yi(t) =
ei(t) and
∑n(t)
i=1 pi(t)Yi(t) = e(t). Also the labor allocation equals the labor
allocation fraction, Li(t) = λLi(t).
Assumption 4. All sectors have the same sectoral output elasticities of cap-
ital, labor and capabilities, i.e. αi = α ∀i ∈ [1, N ].
From equations (3.28) and (3.29) we have now that ki(t) = k(t) and there-
fore all sectors have the same capital-labor ratio equalling the capital-labor
ratio of the whole economy. Noting that Li(t)
1−αKi(t)α = Li(t)ki(t)α =
λLi(t)k(t)
α the production functions can now be simplified to
Yi(t) = λLi(t)k(t)
α(G(t)−G0i)1−α ∀i ∈ [1, N ]. (3.34)
Finally, to be able to model balanced growth, we assume:
Assumption 5. In the absence of external influences the distance between
the subsistence levels of capabilities of successive sectors is constant, i.e.
f(t) = f ∀t.
This implies also a constant d = Bf
η
1−η .
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3.3 Deriving the solution
3.3.1 Competitive equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium of this economy is a sequence of prices (w(t), r(t),
pi(t) ∀i ∈ [1, n(t)]) and quantities (Li(t), Ki(t), ci(t) ∀i ∈ [1, n(t)]) determined
uniquely for given k(0) and G(0) by the differential equations (3.17), (3.18)
and (3.24), the transversality condition (3.21), the equations (3.5), (3.10),
(3.11), (3.12), (3.19), (3.20), (3.30) and (3.32), and the assumptions 1-5.
We collect those equations simplified by the assumptions here for a clearer
synthesis. We omit the time dependency from the notation at this point.
Given k(0) and G(0), the behavior of the economy is described by the fol-
lowing differential equations
e˙
e
= r − δ − ρ,
k˙ = (r − δ)k + w − e,
G˙ =
k˙
d
,
where, given the equations (3.11), (3.12) and assumptions 1,2 and 4
w = (1− α)kαG1−α, (3.35)
r = α
(G
k
)1−α
. (3.36)
The GDP per capita is therefore
y = w + rk = kαG1−α. (3.37)
Given the equation (3.10) and the assumptions 1,2 and 4, the price sequence
is obtained by
pi =
( G
G−G0i
)1−α
∀i ∈ [1, n]. (3.38)
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The demand for each consumption good is
ci =
p−i
P 1−
e,
where the price index P is defined by equation (3.20).
Given the assumptions 3 and 4 along with equations (3.30), (3.32), (3.35)
and (3.37), the labor allocations can be expressed by
Li = λLi =
ei
y
∀i ∈ [1, n], Lx = λLx =
y − e
y
. (3.39)
Given the assumption 3 and solving forKi from the previously noted L
1−α
i K
α
i =
λLik
α gives the capital allocations
Ki = λLik ∀i ∈ [1, n+ 1]. (3.40)
3.3.2 Generalized balanced growth path
We now consider whether the equilibrium conditions are consistent with the
existence of a generalized balanced growth path (GBGP), defined following
Herrendorf et al. (2014) such that the real interest rate, i.e. in our case the
capital rental price r, is constant.
Proposition 1. A GBGP exists, if the growth rate of the societal capabilities
γG equals the growth rate of the capital stock γk, i.e. γG = γk.
Proof. For the capital rental price r = α(G/k)1−α to be constant, we need
the ratio G/k to be constant. Let us define a new variable
z =
G
k
, (3.41)
which is constant along the GBGP. If we now take a logarithm and the time
derivative of both sides of (3.41), we get
z˙
z
=
G˙
G
− k˙
k
, (3.42)
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which is equivalent to
γz = γG − γk. (3.43)
On the GBGP we need γz = 0, which is the case when γG = γk.
The next result shows that along a GBGP of our multi-sector model other
Kaldor facts also hold, i.e. the GDP per capita y and the capital stock per
capita k grow at constant rates, the capital-output ratio k/y is constant and
the shares of GDP received by labor (w/y) and capital (rk/y) are constant.
This is a standard feature of structrural change models that feature a GBGP,
like the one of Herrendorf et al. (2014).
Proposition 2. The Kaldor facts hold along the GBGP.
Proof. We have defined the GBGP so that r is constant, so it suffices to show
that k, w and y grow at the same constant rate γ.
Given a constant r and γG = γk, we have
γw =
w˙
w
=
(1− α)αkα−1k˙G1−α + (1− α)2kαG−αG˙
(1− α)kαG1−α = α
k˙
k
+ (1− α)G˙
G
= γk
(3.44)
and
γy =
y˙
y
=
w˙ + rk˙
w + rk
=
γww + rγkk
w + rk
= γk. (3.45)
The growth rate of capital can be expressed as
γk =
k˙
k
= r − δ + w
k
+
e
k
, (3.46)
which implies that a constant growth rate of capital can only be achieved if
the capital stock grows at the same rate as consumption expenditure e. The
growth rate of consumption expenditure is
γe =
e˙
e
= r − δ − ρ, (3.47)
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which is constant. Let us denote
γ = r − δ − ρ, (3.48)
the rate for balanced growth. We then have γy = γw = γe = γk = γG = γ.
Next we characterize the GBGPs of the economy.
Proposition 3. There are two equilibria, where growth is constant. These
are characterized by interest rates r = δ+ρ and r = α
(
1
d
)1−α
for zero growth
and non-zero growth, respectively.
Proof. Using the terms of Mulligan and Sala-i Martin (1993), let us define a
“control-like” variable which is also constant in the equilibrium,
a =
e
k
, (3.49)
and use it in addition to our “state-like” variable z to characterize the equi-
libria, defined by γa = γz = 0. After some algebra we get
γz = γG − γk =
( 1
dz
− 1
)
(z1−α − δ − a), (3.50)
γa = γe − γk = (α− 1)z1−α − ρ+ a. (3.51)
We can immediately see that γz equals zero at two different points. Setting
both growth rates equal to zero and solving gives the two equilibria
z∗ =
1
d
, a∗ = (1− α)
(1
d
)1−α
+ ρ ∨ z∗ =
(δ + ρ
α
) 1
1−α
, a∗ =
(1− α)δ + ρ
α
.
For z∗ = 1
d
, r = α
(
1
d
)1−α
. According to (3.48), this responds to γ = α
(
1
d
)1−α−
δ − ρ, which can be either negative or positive depending on the parameter
values. If d <
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α , γ > 0, and if d >
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α , γ < 0.
For z∗ =
(
δ+ρ
α
) 1
1−α , r = δ + ρ. This responds to γ = 0.
Note that two equilibria is a specialty of our model and not a common feature
in growth models. The equilibrium at r = δ−ρ responds to a situation where
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the economy invests only to cover the depreciation of capital, and no new
capital is accumulated. This equilibrium could be called a poverty trap,
compared to the other possible equilibrium, if its growth is positive.
3.3.3 Transitional dynamics
To understand what happens if there are initial imbalances between the cap-
ital stock and the societal capabilities, or some type of shock alters some
parameters or stocks of capital or capabilities, we look at the transitional
dynamics of the system. First we look into the stability properties of the
equilibria to prove that transitional dynamics exist, and then proceed to
sketching three phase diagrams of the model, responding to different param-
eter value relations. Note that the transitional dynamics of this model are
not typical due to the presence of two equilibria instead of just one. Most
growth models that feature transitional dynamics feature one saddle-path
stable equilibrium.
Proposition 4. If d <
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α , the equilibrium responding to r = α
(
1
d
)1−α
is saddle-path stable and the equilibrium responding to r = δ + ρ is unstable.
If d >
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α , the equilibrium responding to r = α
(
1
d
)1−α
is unstable and
the equilibrium responding to r = δ + ρ is saddle-path stable.
Proof. See appendix A.4.
We consider separately the three cases, d <
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α , d >
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α and
d =
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α . Figure 3.2 sketches the phase portrait for the first. The
two z˙ = 0 loci and the a˙ = 0 locus divide the area into seven regions, and
the arrows show the direction of motion in all regions based on equations
(3.50) and (3.51). The two points where the a˙ = 0 locus crosses either
of the z˙ = 0 loci are the equilibrium points of the economy. In this case
the stagnant equilibrium on the left is an unstable node, and unless the
economy starts precisely at this point, it will never go there. The other
equilibrium exhibits positive growth and is saddle-path stable, i.e. there
exists one optimal trajectory, shown as the thicker line with arrows, along
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Figure 3.2: Transitional dynamics of the model when d is relatively small.
which the economy will move to the equilibrium by adjusting the control-
like variable a in accordance with the initial value z(0). It is notable that if
z(0) <
(
δ+ρ
α
) 1
1−α , i.e. if z(0), the initial ratio of capabilities to capital, is “too
small”, the economy is not able to reach either equilibrium and ends up at
z = 0.
We then consider the case when d >
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α , presented in Figure 3.3. Now
the stagnant equilibrium on the right is saddle-path stable, and the thicker
line with arrows again shows the optimal trajectory. The other equilibrium
responds to negative growth, i.e. to the shrinking of the economy, and is an
unstable node. If z(0) < 1/d, the economy will not reach any equilibria and
again ends up at z = 0.
Lastly we consider the special case when d =
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α , presented in Fig-
ure 3.4. The stability analysis regarding this case in appendix A.4 was in-
conclusive. We can however conclude by looking at the behavior of equa-
tions (3.50) and (3.51) in different regions that in this case the equilibrium
seems to be “semi-saddle-path stable”, i.e. the equilibrium exhibits saddle-
path stability when approached from the right, but it is unstable when ap-
proached from the left. Again we conclude that if the economy starts from
z(0) < 1/d =
(
δ+ρ
α
) 1
1−α , it will not be able to reach the equilibrium.
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Figure 3.3: Transitional dynamics of the model when d is large.
Let us now briefly consider what these dynamics mean for our actual variables
G, k and e. According to equation (3.24) the growth rates of G and k are
always of the same sign. The imbalances in the two stocks will be corrected,
because the growth rate of the variable that is relatively too low will be
larger than the growth rate of the of the variable that is relatively too large.
Equation (3.24) implies that the growth rates will asymptotically approach
each other and therefore the ratio G/k will asymptotically approach the
equilibrium value.
The total consumption expenditure is a so-called jump variable, which will
be adjusted according to the initial values k(0) and G(0) to set the economy
on the stable arm so that the transversality condition is not violated. After
this the policy function for the consumption expenditure is the usual e˙
e
=
α
(
G
k
)1−α− δ− ρ, which is increasing in G
k
. This means that if G is relatively
low compared to k, the growth rate of e will start below the equilibrium value
γ and increase along the transition. If k is relatively too low, the opposite
is true and the growth rate of e will start above the equilibrium value and
decrease as the economy moves to the equilibrium.
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Figure 3.4: Transitional dynamics of the model when the two equilibria have
merged into one.
3.4 Insights
3.4.1 Optimality
We now consider whether the decentralized solution, i.e. the competitive
equilibrium of this economy (presented in section 3.3.1) is Pareto optimal
by comparing it with a solution of a “social planner” that maximizes the
same utility function as the representative household but takes into account
the “social return” to investment, which in our case differs from the “private
return” to investment, because investment creates a spillover effect and grows
societal capabilities, which benefit all of the producers.
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The optimization problem of the social planner is
max
C(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt lnC(t)dt
s.t. k˙(t) = y(t)− δk(t)− P (t)C(t) = k(t)αG(t)1−α − δk(t)− P (t)C(t),
G˙(t) =
k˙(t)
d
. (3.52)
As shown in the appendix A.5, this yields the Euler equation
e˙
e
= α
(G
k
)1−α
+
1− α
d
(G
k
)−α
− δ − ρ. (3.53)
Remembering that the private return on investment is r = α
(
G
k
)1−α
, we can
see that this expression is the same as the consumer Euler equation except
for the second term, which is positive. In fact, this term expresses the social
return on investment, and the interest rate that the social planner uses is
rsocial = α
(
G
k
)1−α
+ 1−α
d
(
G
k
)−α
. If we recall that the Euler equation equals
the growth rate of the economy on the GBGP, we can conclude that the
growth is faster in the social planner solution and the market solution is not
Pareto optimal. This is due to the positive externality of capital investment.
3.4.2 Behavior of the saving rate
The investment rate of the economy can be defined as the ratio of gross
investment to GDP. Because the only way to save in this model economy
is to invest, we can conclude that in our case the saving rate equals the
investment rate,
s =
X
y
= 1− e
y
. (3.54)
We can immediately see that along the GBGP the saving rate is constant.
Noticing that e
y
= e
k
/ y
k
and that according to equation (3.37) y
k
=
(
G
k
)1−α
,
we can write s = 1 − a
z1−α . Now we can find out the saving rates in the
two equilibria by using the equilibrium values a∗ and z∗ from the proof of
proposition 3. We get s∗ = α − ρd1−α for the non-stagnant equilibrium
and s∗ = αδ
δ+ρ
for the stagnant equilibrium. These two are equal only when
d =
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α , which is the case only when the two equilibria have merged
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into one. Generally the two equilibria exhibit different saving rates.
To see how the saving rate behaves during the transition to an equilibrium,
we write the dynamics of the system in terms of b = e
y
and z. After some
algebra we get
γz =
( 1
dz
− 1
)
((1− b)z1−α − δ), (3.55)
γb = z
1−α
(
αb− 1− α
dz
(1− b)
)
+ (1− α)δ
( 1
dz
− 1
)
− ρ. (3.56)
We can now draw the phase diagram for b and z with these equations. The
two z˙ = 0 loci are z = 1
d
and b = 1− δ
z1−α . The functional form for the b˙ = 0
locus is more complicated,
b =
dρz + (1− α)(z1−α + δ(dz − 1))
(α(dz − 1) + 1)z1−α .
Numerical checks for feasible parameter values show that the general shape of
the locus is always the same, and we proceed to sketching the phase diagram
for two different situations, d <
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α and d >
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α .
Figure 3.5: Transitional dynamics of the model in terms of b and z when d
is relatively small.
Figure 3.5 shows the dynamics for d <
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α . The stable arm is downward
sloping when the equilibrium is approached from the left and upward sloping
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when the equilibrium is approached from the right. Because s = 1 − b, the
behavior of the saving rate is exactly the opposite: the saving rate rises as
z grows. When the equilibrium is approached from the left, i.e. when the
initial value of G is relatively too low, the saving rate rises towards s∗ as the
economy approaches the equilibrium. In other words, if the initial capital
stock is relatively too large, the economy adopts initially a lower saving rate,
which leads to a lower growth rate of the capital stock than in the equilibrium
or if the saving rate was a constant s∗. Furthermore, the lower growth rate
of capital directly implies that also the growth rate of the capabilities will
be lower than with a constant saving rate. Together these imply that the
growth of GDP will unambiguously be slower. However, even if the saving
rate was constant, the growth rate of the capital stock would be lower than
in the equilibrium, because the relatively low level of capabilities harms the
productivity of capital.
When the equilibrium is approached from the right, i.e. when the initial
value of k is relatively too low, the economy adopts a higher saving rate,
leading to a faster growth of the capital stock (and capabilities and GDP)
than in the equilibrium or if the saving rate was a constant s∗. Again note
that also a constant saving rate would produce faster growth than in the
equilibrium, because the productivity of capital is larger due to a relatively
higher level of capabilities.
This behavior is due to the behavior of the interest rate. If we remember that
r = α
(
G
k
)1−α
, we notice that also the interest rate increases as a function of
z. A higher interest rate is a larger incentive for the households to save. As
discussed in section 3.4.1, the interest rate only captures the private return
on capital. If also the social return would be taken into account, the interest
rate would be higher and therefore the saving rate would also be higher at
all times, but especially when z is low.
Figure 3.6 shows the dynamics for d >
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α . Now the stagnant equilib-
rium is the saddle-path stable one. The behavior of the saving rate remains
the same as in the previous case: the saving rate still increases as z in-
creases. When the economic growth is stagnating, i.e. when the equilibrium
is approached from the right, the saving rate decreases.
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Figure 3.6: Transitional dynamics of the model in terms of b and z when d
is relatively large.
3.4.3 Structural change
Following Ngai and Pissarides (2007) we define structural change as the state
in which at least some of the labor shares, equalling in our case the labor
fractions λLi , are changing over time, i.e. λ˙Li 6= 0.
Proposition 5. The labor fraction in the investment sector remains constant
along the GBGP.
Proof. Equation (3.39) defines the labor fraction in the investment sector as
λLx =
y−e
y
. According to equation (3.26) y = e+X, so we can write λLx =
X
y
.
The rate of change is therefore
λ˙Lx
λLx
=
X˙
X
− y˙
y
. (3.57)
Along the GBGP we must have X˙
X
= y˙
y
, and therefore
λ˙Lx
λLx
= 0. .
This means that labor can only move to or away from the investment sector
outside the GBGP, i.e. when the economy is in transition towards the GBGP,
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and when X˙
X
6= y˙
y
. Had we imposed a constant saving rate, the labor fraction
in the investment sector would always be constant.
Proposition 6. In the consumption good sectors the relative labor fractions
grow in proportion to relative prices, the factor of proportionality being one
minus the elasticity of substitution.
Proof. Equation (3.39) defines the labor fraction employed in the production
of good i as λLi = ei/y, and equations (3.16) and (3.19) imply that ei =
(pi/P )
1−e. The relation between the labor fractions of good i and j is
λLi
λLj
=
ei
ej
=
(pi
pj
)1−
. (3.58)
So the growth in relative labor fractions is
λ˙Li
λLi
− λ˙Lj
λLj
= (1− )
( p˙i
pi
− p˙j
pj
)
. (3.59)
Note that this is the same result that Ngai and Pissarides (2007) get for their
model.
Proposition 7. Structural change takes continuously place along the GBGP
responding to r = α
(
1
d
)1−α
, where growth is non-zero. There is no structural
change in the stagnant equilibrium where r = δ + ρ.
Proof. Because we defined structural change as a state where λ˙Li 6= 0, let
us turn to the behavior of the individual consumption goods sectors. The
dynamics of the individual labor fractions of consumption good sectors satisfy
λ˙Li
λLi
=
e˙i
ei
− y˙
y
= (1− )
( p˙i
pi
− P˙
P
)
+
e˙
e
− y˙
y
∀i ∈ [1, n], (3.60)
where, following from the definition of P in (3.20) and the identity ei =
(pi/P )
1−e,
P˙
P
=
n∑
i
ei
e
p˙i
pi
, (3.61)
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which is a weighted average of the rates of price changes, the weight being
each good’s share of total consumption expenditure. We note that along
the GBGP we have e˙
e
= y˙
y
, and the growth of the labor fractions are only
dependent on the growth rates of the prices. This also is a similar result to
that of Ngai and Pissarides (2007).
Let us now see how the individual and the average growth rates of prices
develop over time. The similarities to Ngai and Pissarides (2007) end here,
because their model features external total factor productivity growth rates
and a constant number of operating sectors. According to equation (3.38)
pi =
( G
G−G0i
)1−α
∀i ∈ [1, n].
After some algebra, we get
p˙i
pi
= −(1− α)G˙
G
G0i
G−G0i . (3.62)
We see immediately that if the capabilities do not grow ( G˙
G
=0), which would
be the case only when the economy is in the stagnant equilibrium, the prices
do not change ( p˙i
pi
= 0 ∀i) and, therefore, there cannot be structural change
either according to equation (3.60).
If the growth of capabilities would be negative, which is the case in the
equilibrium responding to r = α
(
1
d
)1−α
when d >
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α , the prices would
rise as G decreases, approaching infinity as G → G0i. When G reaches G0i,
the sector i stops operating. Looking at the equation (3.60) and remembering
that  > 1, this responds to ever decreasing amount of labor in sector i until
all labor is allocated to sectors with a lower G0. We keep in mind that unless
the economy starts from this equilibrium, it will never end up in this situation
of shrinking.
The most interesting case is therefore the one where the growth of capa-
bilities is positive, i.e. the equilibrium responding to r = α
(
1
d
)1−α
when
d <
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α (or the transition towards this equilibrium). We note that the
price change is always negative when there is positive capability growth, i.e.
all consumption good prices decrease over time as a result of the increasing
labor productivity due to the increasing societal capabilities. Along a GBGP
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G˙
G
is constant, and the absolute growth rate of pi is decreasing in G. When
the sector first starts to operate, G−G0i ≈ 0 and the price is close to infin-
ity and decreasing infinitely fast, pi ≈ ∞, p˙ipi ≈ −∞. When the capabilities
grow, G0i becomes smaller and smaller compared to G, and the price asymp-
totically approaches one, while the growth rate of the price asymptotically
approaches zero, pi → 1, p˙ipi → 0.
Because ei = pici =
(
pi
P
)1−
e, we conclude that at the limit ei and ci will
have to approach the same value, ei, ci → e/P 1− as pi → 1. Also the
growth rates of ei and ci must approach the same value, as
p˙i
pi
→ 0. To find
out which value, we look at the known relationships between growth rates.
On the GBGP we have γe = γG. Remembering that in equation (3.24) we
approximated n˙ = G˙/f , we also must have that γG = γn (with a little abuse
of notation as n is actually not continuous). Because e =
∑n
i ei = ne¯i, where
e¯i is the average of ei over i ∈ [i, n], implies γe = γn + γe¯i , we must have
γe¯i = 0, and there cannot be sustained growth of the expenditure on an
individual good in the long run. We conclude that e˙i
ei
, c˙i
ci
→ 0.
As we noted previously, ei =
(
pi
P
)1−
e. Remembering that we have assumed
 > 1, ei is decreasing in pi. Because pi starts at infinity, ei starts at zero.
The growth rate of ei is given by
e˙i
ei
= (1− )
( p˙i
pi
− P˙
P
)
+
e˙
e
. (3.63)
Because p˙i
pi
starts near−∞, e˙i
ei
starts near∞. We know that as p˙i
pi
→ 0, e˙i
ei
→ 0.
We therefore get the result that
P˙
P
→ 1
1− 
e˙
e
(3.64)
over time. And because e = PC, we get that in the long run
C˙
C
=
e˙
e
− P˙
P
→ 
− 1
e˙
e
. (3.65)
From equation (3.60) we can now conclude how the labor fraction behaves.
At first the near infinitely fast growth of e˙i
ei
dominates and the labor fraction
grows very fast. Soon there will be a tipping point when e˙i
ei
= y˙
y
, and the
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labor fraction starts to fall. Over time
λ˙Li
λLi
→ − y˙
y
, (3.66)
and we conclude that the structural change is continuous also in the long run
as labor steadily moves to newly opened sectors. The production in the earlier
sectors however does not decrease due to increased labor productivity.
It must be noted that when the number of sectors is low, the opening of
a new sector has a relatively much larger effect on the ideal price index P
and on the consumption index C and therefore on the momentary utility of
the households. The resulting changes in the expenditure on other individual
goods and in the labor fractions in different sectors are much larger and faster
in the “early stages” of the economy. Momentarily the expenditure on some
good i may also fall due to the disruption caused by the new sector.
3.5 Possible effects of climate policy
In this section we describe some possible effects of the introduction of climate
policy in this framework. The aim of climate policy is to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. There are multiple ways to achieve this, e.g. taxing emissions,
emissions trading or regulation. As mentioned in section 2.1, in an ideal
world the choice of instrument does not make a difference.
We consider separately two possible effects on our economy, compared to a
“business-as-usual” scenario. The first is an increased need of capabilities to
operate a certain sector. The second is making some existing capital obsolete.
For simplicity, we consider the new policies to be implemented instantly.
Let us start with the first effect. Consider an economy which is about to
build an energy sector. In a business-as-usual scenario this sector would op-
erate some relatively cheap coal power plants that do not have very high
requirements for societal capabilities, e.g. in terms of education or financing.
If a climate policy was introduced and the energy sector would be forced to
use low-carbon technologies instead, the energy sector would suddenly need
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employees with higher education than before to design, build and operate
the system. Furthermore, the sector would require to much better financing
possibilities due to the higher capital intensity of low carbon energy tech-
nologies, such nuclear, photovoltaics and fossil plants with carbon capture
and storage equipment (Hirth and Steckel, 2016). In our framework these
requirements imply an increasing G0 for the energy sector, i.e. an increase
in f and therefore in d = Bf
η
1−η . Note that an increasing d implies that
the economy does not only need to accumulate more capabilities before the
energy sector can start, but a unit of capabilities becomes more difficult,
or more expensive, to attain. As discussed in section 3.2.3, this is because
the effectiveness of investment in creating capabilities is decreased when the
opening of new sectors is slowed down. In other words, investments in more
mature sectors do not create new capabilities as efficiently as investments in
a new sector.
Figure 3.7: Behavior of the economy when d suddenly increases. Economy
starts from point A and moves to point B along the stable arm.
Figure 3.7 illustrates how a sudden growth in d affects the economy. In terms
of the phase diagram, the equilibrium is suddenly moved to the left. The
households adjust their consumption to get the economy on the stable arm,
and the economy starts to shift towards the new equilibrium, where the ratio
of capabilities to capital stock is smaller. This will harm the productivity of
capital, which slows down the economic growth. Furthermore, the interest
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rate and therefore the households’ incentive to save will be reduced, which
will decrease the investments and cause the growth to slow down even more.
Figure 3.8: Behavior of the economy when d suddenly decreases.
Once the required capabilities are reached, we could expect d to decrease
again. If we assume that climate policy does not change the distance between
the G0s of the energy sector and the next sector in line, d will return to its
original value. Figure 3.8 illustrates how this affects the economy. The
equilibrium is now moved back to its original position, and the consumption
is immediately adjusted to get the economy on its way towards the new
equilibrium. The growth rate of capabilities will now become greater than the
growth rate of capital, which will start to improve the productivity of capital
and raise interest rates. The households start to save more, which raises the
growth rates of capital, capabilities and the GDP. Once the economy reaches
the equilibrium, the growth rates will be the same as before the climate
policy disrupted the business-as-usual. Because growth has been slower in
between, the GDP per capita will be lower than if the climate policy was
never introduced, but the long-term growth rate is not harmed.
Note that this analysis does not take into account possible effects of climate
change itself - it may well be that some kind of disruption is caused in any
case, and business-as-usual is simply not an option.
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It is important to highlight here that depending on the existing stock of
capital and capabilities, the economy might in fact not reach the new, lower
growth equilibrium before it manages to reach the required G0 and starts to
move back to the original equilibrium. The richer, or the more developed the
country is when it encounters a shift in G0, the faster it will reach the G0
and the smaller is the disruption to its economy. Poorer, or less developed
countries will travel all the way to the new equilibrium and it will take them
much longer to reach the elevated G0 and then it will take them longer to
travel back to the original equilibrium. In conclusion, the disruption to the
economy will be much more severe for poorer countries. But nevertheless,
the countries will not get stuck in poverty.
Figure 3.9: Behavior of the economy when d suddenly increases so much that
the stagnant equilibrium becomes saddle-path stable.
However, if the increase in d is relatively large, the consequences for the
economy are different. Figure 3.9 illustrates a scenario where the equilibrium
is moved further left than the stagnant equilibrium. In this case the stagnant
equilibrium becomes saddle-path stable, and the economy moves towards it
along the new stable arm. If the economy does not manage to reach the next
G0 on the way to the new equilibrium and escape from the path, the growth
will eventually stagnate. In this case the economy never manages to build
the capabilities required to open the new sector and there is no way for the
economy to get out of this stagnant equilibrium on its own. A government
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intervention would be needed to build the necessary capabilities and to get
the economy out of this “poverty trap”. This scenario is much more likely
for the poorer countries, as the richer countries are more likely to be able to
build the required capabilities before they reach stagnation.
Figure 3.10: Behavior of the economy when the stock of capital suddenly
decreases.
The second effect to be considered is climate policy making some capital ob-
solete. This could be a result of rising production standards in the industry,
which would result in the abandoning of some old machines. Loss of capi-
tal would imply an immediate decrease of the GDP, but also an immediate
increase of the capabilities-capital-ratio. The dynamics however remain un-
changed. In the phase diagram, the economy will suddenly move to the right
of the equilibrium. The consumption is again adjusted to get the economy
on the stable arm. The productivity of the remaining capital will increase,
which will increase the interest rate and the saving rate, and the households
will start to invest more. The growth rates of capital, capabilities and the
GDP will increase. Because the capital stock grows faster than capabilities,
the productivity will start to decrease towards the equilibrium value, the in-
terest rate will start to decrease again and eventually the economy will reach
the equilibrium growth again. Only now it is ambiguous whether the level of
GDP is lower or higher than it would have been without the disruption, be-
cause even though there was a sudden reduction of GDP, growth was boosted
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in between.
3.6 Numerical illustrations
This section illustrates the behavior of the economy with a set of standard
benchmark parameter values. Because the model is not an initial value prob-
lem but a boundary value problem, simulating it as is is not very straightfor-
ward. Because our aim is not to perfectly calibrate the model but to visualize
its behavior, we adopt a constant saving rate for the simulations, thus turn-
ing the model into a standard initial value problem. The qualitative behavior
of the model is not changed as a result, as we discuss in appendix A.6.
We adopt the same standard parameter values for α, δ and ρ as Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2004), presented in table 3.1. Widely used estimates for the
elasticity parameter of the constant elasticity of substitution preferences ()
are harder to find. In our case the elasticity of substitution between the
consumption goods has to be more than 1, or otherwise the households would
be reluctant to give up some potential consumption of the older products to
consume new ones. When  > 1, the utility function exhibits love-for-variety,
and consuming more varieties will increase the utility of the household. As
long as  > 1, the chosen value will in fact not affect the development of
the economy on the aggregate level apart from the experienced utility of the
households, so we simply choose a number. The parameter d obviously is
a speciality of our model, and estimates for it do not exist elsewhere. We
choose to set d so that the equilibrium GDP growth rate that the model
produces somewhat corresponds to the actual measured long term growth
rate of the US economy, as also the α, δ and ρ are measured for the US. If we
set d = 5, corresponding to 20% capability-accumulation efficiency of capital
investment, and the other parameters as described, the equilibrium growth
rate of the model is γ = α
(
1
d
)1−α − δ − ρ = 2.7% and the equilibrium saving
rate is s∗ = α−ρd1−α = 24%, not too far from the actually measured growth
rate of 2% and the saving rate of 19% (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
To follow when the new sectors open, we also need to set the values for the
components of d = Bf
η
1−η . Because this formulation is unique to us, we
cannot refer to other literature for benchmark values, and for simplicity we
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set η = 0.5, f = 1 and B = 5. They respond to identical capability index
elasticity of new sectors and new investments, i.e. that η = 1 − η, and
to a unit distance between G0s, and to a 20% capability-contributing share
of investment, adding up to the 20% capability-accumulation efficiency of
investment.
Table 3.1: Parameter values for simulations.
Parameter Definition Value
α Sectoral output elasticity of capital 0.3
δ Depreciation rate of capital 5%
ρ Discount rate 2%
 Elasticity of substitution between goods 1.2
1
B
Capability-contributing share of investments 20%
f Distance between G0s 1
η Capabilities elasticity of new sectors 0.5
s Saving rate 24%
We first look at the behavior along the GBGP. Because the saving rate is
constant along the GBGP, the simulation corresponds to the behavior of
the model exactly. Figure 3.11 shows the development of the GDP, the
capital stock, the consumption expenditure, the wages, the capability index,
the consumption of unit goods and the interest rate over time for the initial
values of G(0) = 1, k(0) = 5. The interest rate is stable, and the growth rates
are equal for all other variables, except only approximately for the number
of unit goods consumed. The number of consumed unit goods varies a little
around the equilibrium growth, because new goods that are introduced are
very expensive in comparison to others and when the total consumption
expenditure stays balanced, the amount of goods fluctuates.
The behavior of the expenditures on and the prices of some single goods is
shown in detail in Figure 3.12. As described in section 3.4.3, the expenditure
on a single new good increases very quickly after the sector starts to operate.
Then the growth trend slows down and starts to stagnate. The expendi-
ture fluctuates around the trend, as the opening of new sectors causes the
households to shift some of the consumption to those sectors. Looking at the
expenditure curves, the dips occur exactly when a new sector is opened, as
can be seen at the second dip on the blue e3 line: as the sector 5 is opened
and the expenditure on good 5 rises steeply (red line, e5), e3 falls. The less
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Figure 3.11: behavior along the GBGP.
(a) Expenditure on goods. (b) Price of goods.
Figure 3.12: Expenditure on and prices of goods produced by sectors 3, 5
and 9 over time.
operating sectors there are, the larger the effect; we see that the dips become
smaller as time passes and more sectors already operate. Also the prices
exhibit the expected behavior: they start very high but decrease very fast
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and approach 1 for each good.
(a) Stocks of capital and capabilities. (b) GDP and the interest rate.
Figure 3.13: Behavior of the system on a logarithmic scale when the ini-
tial value of G is lower than on the GBGP. Dashed black lines indicate the
behavior along the GBGP.
Let us then look at the transitional dynamics of the economy. The differences
in the development of variables are best noticed when compared on a logarith-
mic scale. We first look at the behavior when the initial capabilities-capital-
ratio is smaller than in the equilibrium, with starting values of G(0) = 0.7
and k(0) = 5. The behavior of the capital stock, capabilities, GDP and the
interest rate are shown in Figure 3.13. The black dashed lines illustrate the
behavior along the GBGP, shown in absolute values in Figure 3.11. Along
the GBGP the growth rates of k,G and GDP are constant while r is stable.
Now when the G(0) is below the GBGP, the growth rates of k,G and GDP
are much slower but start to approach the equilibrium growth rate. The
interest rate starts below the equilibrium value but approaches it. The levels
of k,G and GDP are permanently lower than they were when the economy
was on the GBGP from the beginning. Note that even though this result is
qualitatively the same as with consumer optimization, the households would
in fact react to the low interest rate and further slow the transition down.
A constant saving rate approaches the equilibrium faster than the market
equilibrium.
Let us then look at the transitional dynamics when the capabilities-capital-
ratio is above the equilibrium. We set G(0) = 1 and k(0) = 3. Again the
dashed lines represent the behavior along the GBGP for comparison. Now the
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growth rates of k,G and GDP start off larger than in the equilibrium before
converging to it, and the variables actually end up on a higher level than
they would have along the GBGP. The interest rate starts from a higher level
before converging to the equilibrium value. Again note that if the consumers
could optimize the saving rate, they would react to the higher interest rate
and further boost the growth by investing more.
(a) Stocks of capital and capabilities. (b) GDP and the interest rate.
Figure 3.14: Behavior of the system on a logarithmic scale when the ini-
tial value of k is lower than on the GBGP. Dashed black lines indicate the
behavior along the GBGP.
We now move on to simulate the different effects of climate policy described
in section 3.5. We begin with the first effect and increase the G0 of one
sector so that the distance f to the previous sector grows 50% from 1 to
1.5. This responds to growing d from 5 to 7.5. and decreasing the capability
accumulation efficiency of capital investment from 20% to 13%. After the
necessary capabilities for this sector are built and the new G0 is reached,
we let f decrease back to its original value for the later sectors. To illus-
trate how the effect differs for economies at different development stages, we
simulate the change for two different sectors, namely sectors number 4 and
6. Figure 3.15 compares the effects on the GDP, the capital stock, the con-
sumption expenditure and the consumption of unit goods when the economy
is affected at these different stages. In both cases the economies recover and
approach the original growth rates, but if the disruption happens earlier,
it lasts longer and the GDP and all the other variables lag more from the
benchmark GBGP values presented in Figure 3.11. Note that if the saving
rate was not held constant, the consumers would opt for a lower saving rate
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during the disruption, deepening its effects.
(a) G04 grows by 0.5 G. (b) G06 grows by 0.5 G.
Figure 3.15: Behavior of the capital stock, GDP, consumption expenditure
and consumption of unit goods when f grows 50% between two sectors at
different points in development. Dotted lines indicate the time when f = 1.5.
(a) G04 grows by 0.5 G. (b) G06 grows by 0.5 G.
Figure 3.16: Behavior of the capital stock and capabilities on a logarithmic
scale when f grows 50% between two sectors at different points in develop-
ment. Dotted lines indicate the time when f = 1.5.
Figure 3.16 illustrates the effects on capital and capabilities in more detail on
a logarithmic scale. As expected, the growth rate of capabilities reacts faster
to changes than the growth rate of capital. Again we see that the period of
slowing growth lasts much longer if the disruption happens earlier.
Let us then increase f by 150% from 1 to 2.5, responding to increasing d from
5 to 12.5 and decreasing the capability accumulation efficiency of capital
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investment from 20% to 8%. This will take the new equilibrium past the
stagnant equilibrium, and the economies start to approach stagnation. Figure
3.17 compares the effects on the GDP, the capital stock, the consumption
expenditure and the consumption of unit goods for the economies at two
different development stages.
(a) G04 grows by 1.5 G. (b) G06 grows by 1.5 G.
Figure 3.17: Behavior of the capital stock, GDP, consumption expenditure
and consumption of unit goods when f grows 150% for one sector at different
points in development. Dotted lines indicate the time when f = 2.5.
(a) G04 grows by 1.5 G.. (b) G06 grows by 1.5 G..
Figure 3.18: Behavior of the capital stock and capabilities on a logarithmic
scale when f grows 150% for one sector at different points in development.
Dotted lines indicate the time when f = 2.5.
We notice that while the less developed economy on the left cannot build the
necessary capabilities for the new sector and asymptotically approaches stag-
nation, the little further developed economy on the right manages to escape
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the threat of stagnation and starts to move back to the original equilibrium.
The poorer economy is therefore stuck in poverty, while the richer one is able
to continue growing, eventually at the same growth rate as before the shock.
Note again that if the saving rate was not held constant, a smaller decrease
in f would be enough to produce this effect.
Figure 3.18 shows the behavior of k and G in more detail. Again the growth
rate of G reacts faster to changes.
We then move to the second effect of making a share of capital obsolete.
Figure 3.19 shows the development of k, GDP, e and the consumption of
unit goods, as well as the growth of the stocks of capital and capabilities on
a logarithmic scale, when 20% of the capital is suddenly destroyed. As the
capital stock decreases at t = 30, the GDP drops a little, the growth rates
are boosted and after a while the GDP and the other variables actually end
up higher than along the benchmark GBGP. Again note that with consumer
optimization this behavior would be further enhanced.
(a) GDP, k, e and
∑
ci. (b) log(k) and log(G).
Figure 3.19: Behavior of the capital stock, GDP, consumption expenditure,
consumption of unit goods and the capital and capabilities on a logarithmic
scale when the the capital stock decreases 20% at t = 30.
Chapter 4
Discussion
4.1 Realisticity of the approach
The approach employed in this thesis is reasonably realistic in the sense how
it reflects our knowledge of development, the accumulation of capabilities
and structural change. Most importantly, the interplay of capabilities and
structural change is the driver of growth. As the economy develops, it di-
versifies its production structure. However, the model does not account for
the specialization in later stages of development, as documented by Imbs
and Wacziarg (2003). An extension of the model that includes international
trade could be an option to produce this effect.
The model considers a certain level of capabilities to be a prerequisite for a
certain level of production, in line with the theories of Hirschman (1958) and
Bell and Pavitt (1995). Growth takes place essentially through the backward
and forward linkages of Hirschman (1958): investing in a new sector that can
barely operate in the present conditions creates a strong demand for new
capabilities to improve the productivity of the sector (a backward linkage),
and as the capabilities accumulate, they enable and invite new production
activities, that absolutely require these capabilities, to take place (a forward
linkage). As Bell and Pavitt (1995) theorize, the competitive equilibrium ex-
hibits suboptimal levels of investment; a government policy would be needed
to reach the optimum. As documented by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009),
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the available capabilities determine the complexity of production, which cor-
relates with the country’s income level, and deviations from this relationship
predict future growth, as in the model higher than balanced capability-capital
ratio temporarily boosts growth rates. In line with the findings of Hausmann
and Klinger (2006), the speed at which the economy can diversify into new
sectors, and therefore the aggregate growth rate, depend on the “proximity”
of nearby goods that are increasingly complex.
The accumulation dynamic of capabilities is perhaps both the greatest strength
and the greatest weakness of the model. It is a strength, because it captures
the basic intuition in a very simple way that requires no tracking of when
exactly the last sectors were opened, which would be analytically challeng-
ing. But the accumulation function does assume that if the distance between
two successive sectors in terms of capability requirements is longer than the
previous one, the accumulation of capabilities slows down immediately after
the first sector of this pair is opened. Unless we assume that the proximity
of the possibility to open new production activities acts as an encouraging
force to develop capabilities (kind of a backward linkage extending further
back than discussed before), this is not very intuitive. Nevertheless, we take
it as a necessary approximation to reduce a significant amount of complexity.
Another question concerning the accumulation of capabilities is if they truly
are a spillover, i.e. an unintended consequence of investing into new functions
or rather something that requires deliberate investment from the government.
The literature points to both directions, and it is of course intuitive to think
that social capital accumulates as a spillover, whereas infrastructure obvi-
ously needs to be invested in, usually by the government. It might also be
the case that the main accumulation channel of capabilities varies according
to the development phase. However, like already mentioned in section 3.2.3,
as long as we assume that the government-provided capabilities are accumu-
lated as a response to the needs of new production sectors and do not need to
be funded with taxes, it should not be problematic to model them with our
dynamic. The government could respond to the demand with funds received
from foreign aid or resource rents (profits from extracting natural resources).
In this case, the “responsiveness” of the government to the capability demand
could be described with the parameter B.
There is one peculiar detail about the model worth pointing out. In a situa-
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tion where the economy is stuck in the stagnant equilibrium but the equilib-
rium is unstable, the model implies that the stagnant state could in fact be
“escaped” by destroying some of the existing capital, because it is the rela-
tive lack of capabilities that causes trouble for future development. In the
model, the falling share of capital raises the productivity of existing capital
and therefore the interest rate, which induces growth in investments. This is
due to the assumption that capital and labor can freely move across sectors.
If the capital employed in one sector would somehow be lost, some existing
capital from other sectors would be allocated to it to respond to the demand
of the consumers. This is of course somewhat unrealistic. But if the capital
loss would be spread across sectors and be only partial, the raising produc-
tivity of capital and interest rates could be true. We might still question that
replacing the once existed capital produces the same learning effects and con-
tributions to capabilities as investing in new types of productive activities -
after all, we do not expect this to happen when replacing depreciated capital.
Contributions to capabilities might perhaps take place if the loss of capital
encourages the producers to rethink and reorganize their production and to
acquire new technologies significantly faster than just through replacing de-
preciated capital. This might be the case with climate policy, as presented in
section 3.5. If the producers would suddenly have to stop using old polluting
capital, they most certainly would need to replan their production and would
likely also create learning spillovers while doing it. However, this might only
be true for high enough levels of capabilities, especially education. In general,
the destruction of capital does not seem like a very reliable way of creating
a growth boost.
4.2 Innovativeness of the approach
The model is mostly built on widely approved foundational assumptions of
economic modeling, and uses well established functional forms to describe
production and demand. Adopting multiple sectors, adding a subsistence
level of capabilities for each sector and making the accumulation of capabil-
ities dependent on the proximity of other sectors yields unique dynamics.
Relative to the previous efforts to describe the relationship of structural
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change and capabilities, presented in section 2.4, we could consider this ap-
proach rather innovative: it manages - with a simple setup - to describe
the desired dynamics endogenously and in compliance with the Kaldor facts.
Also the stylized facts of structural change can be replicated with an appro-
priate assumption about the order of complexity of the sectors; we assume
the sectors that become available first to include agricultural production and
some very basic services, then be followed by some less basic services but
mostly manufacturing of increasing complexity, and finally be followed by
mostly advanced services. This will cause the value added share and the
labor share of agriculture to decline, those of services to rise and those of
manufacturing to exhibit a hump-shape.
It is also worth reflecting on how different the capabilities are as a source
of growth compared to the development of technology, which is the neoclas-
sical idea. In a national context, not very. As capabilities can be thought
to describe the ability of a country to adopt technology, we could assume
that countries are only able to develop technology that they have the capa-
bility to use. In an international context, the views differ, as the available
capabilities limit the adoption of relatively advanced technology developed
somewhere else. In terms of this model, the used capabilities measure G can
very well be thought to include the development of the “general” level of
available technology. The most important differentiator between this model
and the neoclassical models is that the neoclassical models tend to model the
development of technology only exogenously, which means that they are not
attempting to explain it at all, whereas our approach is endogenous and can
in fact be considered to explain the development of technology.
4.3 Policy implications
The contributions of this thesis are the formulation of an economic theory
where development is driven by capabilities and structural change, and the
insight that according to this theory an external influence, such as climate
policy or globalization, may pose a threat to development. This is important,
because this theory provides an explanation for the fears of developing coun-
tries regarding climate policy and may therefore help design such a policy
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that does not jeopardize development. To our knowledge, this is the first
effort to theoretically show that climate policy can affect long term develop-
ment. Let us consider what can be learnt from the used approach, and what
are the possible policy implications.
First of all, the very structure of the model implies the existence of a “poverty
trap”, i.e. a situation of economic stagnation of which the economy cannot
get out on its own, without the help of a policy or some other external
assistance. In our model, a relative lack of capabilities can cause the economy
to get stuck in the trap. This can be considered to be in line with Robinson
and Acemoglu (2012) who suggest that low-quality institutions cause poverty
traps.
It is noteworthy that in the model an economy of any income level may face
the risk of stagnation due to a strong external influence or a change in the
economic environment. There are two possible situations that can cause the
economy to move to the stagnant equilibrium. First, if existing capabilities
are somehow destroyed to a large enough extent, the economy might move to
the stagnant equilibrium. However, if the dynamics of the economy remain
unchanged, the stagnant equilibrium is unstable and to get there, the econ-
omy needs to lose a very specific amount of capabilities. A loss any larger
than this would cause the economy to collapse, and a loss any smaller than
this would only slow growth down, but the economy would eventually rebuild
the lost capabilities and return to the original growth equilibrium. Because
the limit of “too much” is determined by the loss of capabilities relative to
the capital stock, richer countries with higher capital stock and capabilities
can afford to lose absolutely more capabilities before they are in danger of
stagnation. The second possibility to get to the stagnant equilibrium is that
the accumulation of capabilities suddenly becomes much more difficult, i.e.
the dynamics of the economy change and the stagnant equilibrium becomes
the stable one. If the change is permanent, richer countries have no ad-
vantage over the poorer countries and their economies too will eventually
stagnate - but on a higher income level, naturally. However, if the change
in the dynamics is temporary, i.e. the accumulation of capabilities is only
harder for a time due to a disturbance in a specific sector, the richer countries
are less likely to stagnate. Overall the model implies that more developed
countries have more resilience to temporary disturbances of structural change
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and capability accumulation.
In section 3.5 we already assessed that climate policy could change the dy-
namics of the economy temporarily by disabling some sectors or by raising
the capability requirements for certain sectors. As less developed countries
are more severely affected, one could draw a conclusion that it is best to
let developing countries grow now as fast as possible with the help of fossil
fuels and then deal with the consequences of climate change later, when the
economies are better equipped to handle the shock.
To evaluate this idea, we need to consider the damages and changes that
climate change is likely to cause. Climate change might increase the capabil-
ity requirements of sectors in terms of infrastructure and perhaps education
and institutions, due to the changing conditions. This is also acknowledged
by Bowen et al. (2012), who argues that investment in infrastructure and
efforts to stimulate entrepreneurship and competitive markets must recog-
nise climate risks and take more of a risk management perspective. In the
model framework, the effect would then be similar as described for climate
policy in section 3.5, i.e. a temporary - or perhaps permanent - spreading
of G0s further apart. However, losses of infrastructure and thus capabilities
due to hardened weather conditions are still likely. Another significant is-
sue are the risks that climate change poses to agriculture and in some areas
to water supply, and therefore to food and water security. Loss of crops
due to drought or excessive rain could quickly raise the prices of food and
cause rising inequality and polarization of the society. Desertification could
completely disable agriculture in some areas and the rising sea levels could
force massive amounts of people to relocate, which can be expected to create
tensions. These are not situations that foster high levels of social capital
(Woolcock, 1998), and instability and risks of conflicts could severely harm
the capabilities of an economy, up to the extent that the capabilities are low
enough to cause the economy to effectively collapse. It seems unlikely that
the developing countries could develop fast enough to gain enough resilience
to counter these threats even with the continued help of fossil fuels.
Because on the one hand strict climate policy measures too early might drive
developing countries to poverty traps and on the other hand too much delay
could also lead to the same or worse, an optimal policy response could be
a question of timing. Some level of climate stress is unavoidable, as the
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changes have already started to take place, and the resilience of developing
countries must be strengthened. However, allowing developing countries to
fuel their growth with further building of coal power plants will lead to lock-
in effects for decades, and this alone is likely to make climate mitigation
targets infeasible (Steckel et al., 2015). This seems to be much too large of
a risk to take.
Therefore, developing countries might not be able to tackle this challenge on
their own and the best response seems to be that developed countries support
developing countries in accumulating the necessary capabilities for continued
growth while limiting emissions. According to the model framework, this can
be done in two ways: either by supporting the vitality of the crucial sectors
that accumulate needed capabilities or by building the capabilities directly.
It is likely that both are needed for an optimal outcome.
Further research is needed to determine the optimal policy, because the af-
fected sectors and the capabilities they would have provided need to be iden-
tified. It should be assessed whether it makes more sense to support the
sectors or to attempt to create the capabilities through different means. If
climate policy harms the competitiveness of a sector, it could for example be
supported by exempting it from climate policy or by rehearsing some type
of protectionism or by granting subsidies. Another approach would be to
support the sector in building the capabilities it needs to be competitive, e.g.
through technology transfers, different kinds of education and consulting.
This could be the right approach also if the required minimum capability
level for the sector to operate has increased. In some cases it might make
sense to abandon the sector and simply attempt to build the capabilities
required for more advanced production through different means. A sector-
specific assessment might ease the identification of the specific capabilities
that are necessary at a specific time and in a specific situation.
The supporting of specific sectors could hopefully allow the economy to de-
velop organically and to avoid the poverty trap. However, it might be useful
to accelerate the development through the building of well-known important
capabilities. Based on what we have learned in chapter 2, we can form an
initial hypothesis that it seems crucial to help developing countries electrify
their economies using low-carbon energy sources and to help them build low-
carbon transport infrastructure, such as railways, along with helping them
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gain the capability to operate them. The development of social capital could
be supported by reducing inequality, for instance through initiatives such as
universal basic income, free education and access to financing, which could
be expected to lead to improving institutional quality.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The objectives of this thesis were to construct a theory of economic growth
that is consistent with the literature on capabilities, the main observed fea-
tures of economic development and the newest empirical findings regarding
structural change, and to use the attained framework to provide insights on
the possible implications of the introduction of climate policy to developing
economies.
This thesis has presented an endogenous multi-sector growth model, in which
growth is driven by the interplay of societal capabilities and ongoing struc-
tural change. The behavior of the model replicates the stylized facts of
economic growth and structural change.
The model is also consistent with the empirical findings concerning disaggre-
gated structural change. The available capabilities determine the complexity
and the diversity of the economy, and the speed at which the economy can
move to increasingly complex activities depends on the proximity of new
potential sectors, in terms of the capabilities that they require.
There are two equilibria in the model, one of them representing stagnation
and the other one representing balanced growth. An external influence that
disables a production sector, raises the capabilities needed by a production
sector, hinders the development of capabilities or decreases the available ca-
pabilities may cause the economy to move to the stagnant equilibrium. Less
78
5 CONCLUSION 79
developed countries are especially in danger, and even if the disturbance
would not drive them to the “poverty trap”, they suffer more from these
disturbances in terms of forgone GDP than more developed countries.
Hence, also the adoption of climate policy measures is recognized to pose a
threat to development. To our knowledge, this is the first effort to theoreti-
cally show that climate policy can have an effect on long term development.
This is important, because this theory provides a possible explanation for
the fears of developing countries regarding climate policy and may therefore
help design such a policy that does not jeopardize development. This theory
suggests a focus on capabilities in policy design.
This result is of course limited by the assumptions from which it follows.
Most crucially capabilities are assumed mainly to accumulate as a spillover
from investing into new productive activities. If capabilities instead mainly
accumulate as the government’s deliberate investment decision independent
of the needs of the current production, climate policy need not threaten
development through the mechanism presented here.
Future research efforts should be directed to gain a deeper understanding
of the accumulation mechanics of societal capabilities, and to recognize the
capabilities that are necessary to successfully industrialize an economy. To
mitigate the risks that climate policy poses to developing economies, it would
be useful to identify the sectors that are likely to be affected by climate policy
and to analyze the capabilities they would have provided. This knowledge can
be used to plan an optimal policy to support the accumulation of necessary
capabilities while limiting emissions.
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Appendix A
Calculations
A.1 Optimization problem of the firm
The optimization problem of the firm is
max
Li(t),Ki(t)
pii(t) = Pi(t)Yi(t)−W (t)Li(t)−R(t)Ki(t), (A.1)
The first-order conditions for this problem are
∂pii(t)
∂Li(t)
= Pi(t)MPLi(t)−W (t) = Pi(t)(1−αi)Ai(t)ki(t)αi(G(t)−G0i)βi−W (t) = 0
(A.2)
∂pii(t)
∂Ki(t)
= Pi(t)MPKi(t)−R(t) = Pi(t)αiAi(t)ki(t)αi−1(G(t)−G0i)βi−R(t) = 0,
(A.3)
which give
W (t) = Pi(t)MPLi(t) = Pi(t)(1− αi)Ai(t)ki(t)αi(G(t)−G0i)βi (A.4)
R(t) = Pi(t)MPKi(t) = Pi(t)αiAi(t)ki(t)
αi−1(G(t)−G0i)βi , (A.5)
where we have denoted ki(t) = Ki(t)/Li(t), the capital-labor ratio in sector i
at time t. Because the firms operate under perfect competition, the absolute
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output prices represent unit cost
Pi(t) =
W (t)Li(t) +R(t)Ki(t)
Yi(t)
. (A.6)
By multiplying both sides with Yi(t), we notice that
Pi(t)Yi(t) = W (t)Li(t) +R(t)Ki(t). (A.7)
Because revenues equal the costs, the firm’s profits are always zero.
A.2 Optimization problem of the household
The optimization problem of the household is
max
ci(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt ln
( n(t)∑
i=1
ci(t)
−1

) 
−1
dt
s.t. k˙(t) = (r(t)− δ)k(t) + w(t)−
n(t)∑
i=1
pi(t)ci(t). (A.8)
Let us first leave the intertemporal element out and just maximize utility for
a given timepoint t. The problem then becomes
max
ci(t)
ln
( n(t)∑
i=1
ci(t)
−1

) 
−1
s.t. k˙(t) = (r(t)− δ)k(t) + w(t)−
n(t)∑
i=1
pi(t)ci(t). (A.9)
The Lagrangian is
L(ci(t), λ(t)) = ln
( n(t)∑
i=1
ci(t)
−1

) 
−1
+λ(t)((r(t)−δ)k(t)+w(t)−
n(t)∑
i=1
pi(t)ci(t)−k˙(t)).
(A.10)
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The first order conditions yield( ci(t)
cj(t)
)− 1

=
pi(t)
pj(t)
∀i 6= j ∈ [1, n(t)]. (A.11)
Following Acemoglu (2008) on page 556 we define an ideal price index P (t)
so that (cj(t)
C(t)
)− 1

=
pj(t)
P (t)
. (A.12)
We now solve for P (t):
P (t) = pj(t)
(C(t)
cj(t)
)− 1

= pj(t)
( n(t)∑
i=1
( ci(t)
cj(t)
) −1

) 1
1−
. (A.13)
We can now substitute (A.11) to get:
P (t) = pj(t)
( n(t)∑
i=1
(pi(t)
pj(t)
)1−) 1
1−
=
( n(t)∑
i=1
pi(t)
1−
) 1
1−
. (A.14)
We can now express consumption demand for good i in terms of its price
pi(t), the price index P (t) and the total consumption expenditure e(t). Let
us start by rearranging (A.11) to get
ci(t) =
(pi(t)
pj(t)
)−
cj(t),
and continue by multiplying both sides with pi(t) and summing over all
products i
n(t)∑
i=1
pi(t)ci(t) = pj(t)
cj(t)
n(t)∑
i=1
pi(t)
1−.
We can now see that the left hand side of the equation is the total consump-
tion expenditure e(t) and on the right hand side we have our price index
P (t). Rearranging and changing the notation of the index from j to i we get
the demand
ci(t) =
pi(t)
−
P (t)1−
e(t). (A.15)
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We can now substitute this into the definition of the consumption index
C(t) =
( n(t)∑
i=1
( pi(t)−
P (t)1−
e(t)
) −1

) 
−1
,
and simplify, use the definition of price index (A.14) again and rearrange to
get
e(t) = P (t)C(t). (A.16)
Substituting these to the optimization problem yields
max
C(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt lnC(t)dt
s.t. k˙(t) = (r(t)− δ)k(t) + w(t)− P (t)C(t). (A.17)
The present-value Hamiltonian is
H = e−ρt lnC(t) + ν(t)((r(t)− δ)k(t) + w(t)− P (t)C(t)), (A.18)
where ν(t) is a costate variable. The first-order conditions are
∂H
∂C
=
e−ρt
C(t)
− ν(t)P (t) = 0, (A.19)
∂H
∂k
= ν(t)((r(t)− δ) = −ν˙(t), (A.20)
and the standard transversality condition is
lim
t→∞
ν(t)k(t) = 0. (A.21)
We now solve the first order equations to attain the Euler equation. We start
by solving for ν(t) in (A.19) and get
ν(t) =
e−ρt
P (t)C(t)
=
e−ρt
e(t)
. (A.22)
We now take the derivative with respect to time on both sides to get
ν˙(t) = −ρe
−ρt
e(t)
− e
−ρt
e(t)2
e˙(t). (A.23)
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We now substitute (A.22) ja (A.23) into (A.20) and simplify to get
e˙(t)
e(t)
= r(t)− δ − ρ, (A.24)
which is the Euler equation.
A.3 Factor allocations
The sectoral output elasticities are
ζLi =
∂Yi(t)
∂Li(t)
Li(t)
Yi(t)
= 1− αi, ζKi =
∂Yi(t)
∂Ki(t)
Ki(t)
Yi(t)
= αi. (A.25)
The define the GDP expenditure shares si(t) as
si(t) =
pi(t)Yi(t)
Y (t)
,
n(t)+1∑
i=1
si(t) = 1. (A.26)
The expenditure shares for consumption goods are
si(t) =
Lei(t)
Y (t)
∀i ∈ [1, n(t)], (A.27)
And the expenditure share of investment is
sx(t) =
X(t)
Y (t)
=
Y (t)− Le(t)
Y (t)
. (A.28)
We define the macro factor income shares
ηL(t) =
w(t)L
Y (t)
; ηK(t) =
r(t)K(t)
Y (t)
. (A.29)
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If we now note that based on equations (A.25),(3.11),(3.12) and (A.26)
ζLi =
∂Yi(t)
∂Li(t)
Li(t)
Yi(t)
=
w(t)
pi(t)
Li(t)
Yi(t)
=
w(t)Li(t)
si(t)Y (t)
,
ζKi =
∂Yi(t)
∂Ki(t)
Ki(t)
Yi(t)
=
r(t)
pi(t)
Ki(t)
Yi(t)
=
r(t)Ki(t)
si(t)Y (t)
, (A.30)
we can determine the factor allocation fractions in terms of expenditure
shares, sectoral output elasticities and macro factor income shares based
on equations (3.30), (3.31), (A.25), (A.29) and (A.30) as
λLi(t) =
Li(t)
L
=
w(t)Li(t)Y (t)
w(t)LY (t)
=
w(t)Li(t)
Y (t)
Y (t)
w(t)L
=
ζLisi(t)
ηL(t)
=
(1− αi)si(t)
ηL(t)
,
λKi(t) =
Ki(t)
K(t)
=
r(t)Ki(t)Y (t)
r(t)K(t)Y (t)
=
r(t)Ki(t)
Y (t)
Y (t)
r(t)K(t)
=
ζKisi(t)
ηK(t)
=
αisi(t)
ηK(t)
.
(A.31)
We can now substitute equations (A.27) and (A.28) back in to get
λLi(t) =
(1− αi)ei(t)
w(t)
∀i ∈ [1, n(t)], λLx(t) =
(1− αx)(y(t)− e(t))
w(t)
,
(A.32)
λKi(t) =
αiei(t)
r(t)k(t)
∀i ∈ [1, n(t)], λKx(t) =
αx(y(t)− e(t))
r(t)k(t)
. (A.33)
A.4 Stability of the equilibria
As our system is nonlinear, we linearize the system around the equilibria
z∗, a∗ and via the determinant and the trace of the Jacobian matrix of the
linearized system we draw conclusions about the eigenvalues, which charac-
terize the behavior of the system at least locally in the neighborhoods of the
equilibria.
We define the system
z˙ = f(z, a) =
(1
d
− 1
)
(z1−α − δ − a), (A.34)
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a˙ = g(z, a) = ((α− 1)z1−α − ρ+ α)α. (A.35)
We then set new variables as the distances from the equilibrium points
u = z − z∗, v = a− a∗. (A.36)
Note that u˙ = z˙ and v˙ = a˙. To linearize the system, we approximate it
around the equilibria with a Taylor series expansion as follows:
u˙ ≈ f(z∗, a∗) + ∂f
∂z
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
u+
∂f
∂a
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
v, (A.37)
v˙ ≈ g(z∗, a∗) + ∂g
∂z
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
u+
∂g
∂a
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
v. (A.38)
Note that f(z∗, a∗) = g(z∗, a∗) = 0. We can write this as matrices
[
u˙
v˙
]
≈
∂f∂z
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
∂f
∂a
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
∂g
∂z
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
∂g
∂a
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
[u
v
]
, (A.39)
where the coefficient matrix is the Jacobian matrix of the system. Let us
denote it by J . The eigenvalues of J carry important information about the
behavior of the system near the equilibrium points. If the eigenvalues are
real and of opposite signs, the phase portrait is a saddle. If the real parts
of eigenvalues are both negative, the equilibrium is stable and the phase
portrait is a sink. If they are both positive, the equilibrium is unstable and
the phase portrait is a source. Let
τ = trJ =
∂f
∂z
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
+
∂g
∂a
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
(A.40)
be the trace and
D = detJ =
∂f
∂z
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
∂g
∂a
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
− ∂f
∂a
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
∂g
∂z
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
(A.41)
be the determinant of the Jacobian matrix. The eigenvalues of the matrix are
the roots of the characteristic polynomial, defined as p(λ) = det(J−λI). We
can now express the polynomial with the help of the trace and determinant
as
p(λ) = λ2 − τλ+D. (A.42)
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The roots of p(λ) can be found with the help of the quadratic formula
λ =
τ ±√τ 2 − 4D
2
. (A.43)
Based on this equation we can draw conclusions about the eigenvalues with
the help of the trace and the determinant. Clearly if D < 0, the eigenvalues
are real and of opposite signs. If D > 0, The sign of the (real part of the)
eigenvalues depends on the trace; if τ < 0, the eigenvalues are negative, and
if τ > 0, the eigenvalues are positive.
The partial derivatives are
∂f
∂z
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
=
(1− α)
d
z∗−α − (2− α)z∗1−α + δ + a∗, (A.44)
∂f
∂a
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
= z∗ − 1
d
(A.45)
∂g
∂z
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
= −(1− α)2a∗z∗−α (A.46)
∂g
∂a
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
= 2a∗ − (1− α)z∗1−α − ρ (A.47)
Let us then proceed to calculating the trace and the determinant at both
equilibrium points. We start with z∗ = 1/d, a∗ = (1−α)(1/d)1−α + ρ. As we
can straight away see that ∂f
∂a
∣∣
z∗,a∗ = 0, we get
D =
∂f
∂z
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
∂g
∂a
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
= (−α
(1
d
)1−α
+ δ + ρ)((1− α)
(1
d
)1−α
+ ρ). (A.48)
We can see that ∂g
∂a
∣∣
z∗,a∗ is clearly always positive. Therefore the determinant
is negative, when ∂f
∂z
∣∣
z∗,a∗ is negative, i.e. when
d <
( α
δ + ρ
) 1
1−α
. (A.49)
When this condition holds, this equilibrium is saddle-path stable. If ∂f
∂z
∣∣
z∗,a∗
is positive, i.e. when d >
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α , the determinant is positive and we must
look at the trace to determine the stability properties. Recall that the trace
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is
τ =
∂f
∂z
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
+
∂g
∂a
∣∣∣
z∗,a∗
, (A.50)
which is clearly positive in our area of interest, defined by ∂f
∂z
∣∣
z∗,a∗ > 0. There-
fore we can conclude that this equilibrium is unstable, when d >
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α .
In the special case when d =
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α , D = 0 and this determinant-trace-
analysis is inconclusive. Note that this responds to the situation when the
two equilibria of the system are at the exact same point.
Let us then look at the other equilibrium point, z∗ =
(
δ+ρ
α
) 1
1−α , a∗ = (1−α)δ+ρ
α
.
Now
D =
[
(1− α)δ + ρ
α
(1
d
(δ + ρ
α
) −1
1−α − 1
)][(1− α)δ + ρ
α
]
−[(δ + ρ
α
) 1
1−α − 1
d
][
− (1− α)2
(δ + ρ
α
) −α
1−α (1− α)δ + ρ
α
]
. (A.51)
We can see that ∂g
∂a
∣∣
z∗,a∗ is again always positive and that
∂g
∂z
∣∣
z∗,a∗ is always
negative. When d >
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α , then ∂f
∂z
∣∣
z∗,a∗ < 0 but
∂f
∂a
∣∣
z∗,a∗ > 0. This
time we cannot draw conclusions about the sign of the determinant just by
looking at the pieces. Let us rearrange the second term of the equation. We
note that
(
δ+ρ
α
) −α
1−α = δ+ρ
α
(
δ+ρ
α
) −1
1−α to get
D = (1− α)δ + ρ
α
(1
d
(δ + ρ
α
) −1
1−α − 1
)(1− α)δ + ρ
α
−
(1− α)2 δ + ρ
α
(1
d
(δ + ρ
α
) −1
1−α − 1
)(1− α)δ + ρ
α
. (A.52)
We can now see that the absolute value of the first term of the determinant
is always larger than the absolute value of the second term, and therefore
the sign of the determinant is determined by the first term, specifically by
∂f
∂z
∣∣
z∗,a∗ . We can conclude that the determinant is negative when
∂f
∂z
∣∣
z∗,a∗ is
negative, i.e. when d >
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α and positive when ∂f
∂z
∣∣
z∗,a∗ is positive, i.e.
when d <
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α . The trace is again positive whenever the determinant is
positive. Therefore, the equilibrium is saddle-path stable when d >
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α
and unstable when d <
(
α
δ+ρ
) 1
1−α .
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A.5 Optimization problem of the social plan-
ner
The optimization problem of the social planner is
max
C(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt lnC(t)dt
s.t. k˙(t) = k(t)αG(t)1−α − δk(t)− P (t)C(t),
G˙(t) =
k˙(t)
d
=
1
d
(k(t)αG(t)1−α − δk(t)− P (t)C(t)). (A.53)
The present-value Hamiltonian is
H = e−ρt lnC(t) + (ν(t) +
µ(t)
d
)(k(t)αG(t)1−α − δk(t)− P (t)C(t)), (A.54)
where ν(t) and µ(t) are costate variables. The first-order conditions are
∂H
∂C
=
e−ρt
C(t)
− (ν(t) + µ(t)
d
)P (t) = 0, (A.55)
∂H
∂k
= (ν(t) +
µ(t)
d
)(α
(G
k
)1−α
− δ) = −ν˙(t), (A.56)
∂H
∂G
= (ν(t) +
µ(t)
d
)(1− α)
(G
k
)−α
= −µ˙(t), (A.57)
We can now use (A.55) to solve for
ν(t) +
µ(t)
d
=
e−ρt
C(t)P (t)
=
e−ρt
e(t)
, (A.58)
and substitute this into equations (A.56) and (A.57). We now take the time
derivative of (A.58) to get
ν˙(t) +
µ˙(t)
d
= −−ρe
−ρt
e(t)
− e
−ρt
e(t)2
e˙(t). (A.59)
We then substitute (A.56) and (A.57) here and simplify, which yields the
A.6 CONSTANT SAVING RATE 97
Euler equation
e˙
e
= α
(G
k
)1−α
+
1− α
d
(G
k
)−α
− δ − ρ. (A.60)
A.6 Constant saving rate
In this section we briefly show that the behavior of the system is qualitatively
similar with a constant saving rate and with consumer optimization.
Utilizing the saving rate s = X
y
= 1− e
y
we can write the capital accumulation
rule as
k˙ = sy − δk = skαG1−α − δk, (A.61)
so the growth rate of the capital stock is
k˙
k
= s
(G
k
)1−α
− δ = sz1−α − δ. (A.62)
The growth rate of the capabilities is
G˙
G
=
k˙
dG
=
1
dz
(sz1−α − δ), (A.63)
so the growth rate of z is
z˙
z
=
G˙
G
− k˙
k
=
( 1
dz
− 1
)
(sz1−α − δ). (A.64)
This equals zero at two points: at z = 1
d
and at z =
(
δ
s
) 1
1−α . The first one is
not dependent on s and always coincides with the non-stagnant equilibrium
of the system with consumer optimization. The second one only coincides
with the stagnant equilibrium if s equals the stagnant equilibrium saving rate
s∗ = αδ
δ+ρ
. For the simulations in section 3.6 we will however use the non-
stagnant equilibrium saving rate s∗ = α− ρd1−α. As a result the location of
the stagnant equilibrium will differ a little with the constant saving rate.
With the help of equation (A.64) we can now sketch the behavior of the
growth rate of z as function of z for the two possible orders of the equilibria
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for some constant s. These are presented in Figures A.1 and A.2. The
arrows indicate the direction of movement along the path. We can see that
as with the consumer optimization, the equilibrium further on the left is
always unstable and the equilibrium on the right is stable. The behavior of
the growth rates of k and G is qualitatively similar to consumer optimization:
when the positive-growth-equilibrium z = 1
d
is approached from the left, G
grows faster than k, and the vice versa when the equilibrium is approached
from the right.
Section 3.4.2 already discussed the differences in the transitional dynamics
between constant and consumer optimized saving rates. In summary, the
behavior is qualitatively the same, as growth always slows down left of the
positive growth equilibrium z = 1
d
and speeds up right of the equilibrium.
The optimization of the saving rate just enhances this behavior.
Figure A.1: Transitional dynamics of the model for a constant saving rate
when d is relatively small.
Figure A.2: Transitional dynamics of the model for a constant saving rate
when d is relatively large.
